CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1364
Appendix I/Volume II
26 September 1995

Original: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX I

VOLUME II

Texts of documents issued by the

Conference on Disarmament

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1292
CD/NTB/WP.208
1 February 1995

Original: English

LETTER DATED 27 JANUARY 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COORDINATOR OF THE GROUP OF 21, ON THE ITEM "NUCLEAR TEST BAN", ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A WORKING PAPER ENTITLED "STATEMENT OF THE GROUP OF 21 IN THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON A NUCLEAR TEST BAN ON 16 DECEMBER 1994"

In my capacity as Coordinator of the Group of 21 on agenda item "Nuclear Test Ban", I have the pleasure in submitting herewith a Group of 21 Working Paper entitled "Statement of Group of 21 in the Ad hoc Committee on Nuclear Test Ban on 16 December 1994".

I would be grateful if this Working Paper could be distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament as well as the Working Paper of the Ad hoc Committee on Nuclear Test Ban.

(Signed): Satish Chandra
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Working Paper

Statement of Group of 21 in the Ad hoc Committee on Nuclear Test Ban on 16 December 1994

The Group of 21 welcomes the First Committee resolution A/C.1/49/L.22/Rev.1 (General Assembly resolution 49/70) on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty adopted without a vote. The Group reiterates its call upon the members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, to urgently conclude the negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty during 1995.

In the context of discussions during the intersessionals the Group would like to reiterate that the verification system under a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty should be universal in its application, non-discriminatory in character and should guarantee equal access to all States. It should be internationally supervised and technically effective. The verification regime should also be cost effective so that the States parties are not over-burdened by an expensive verification regime.

Further, the Group notes with disappointment the US proposal for simplified withdrawal procedures submitted in the Ad hoc Committee on NTB on 17 August 1994 and reflected under Article on Review of the Treaty on page 56 of CD/1273/Rev.1, dated 5 September 1994. The Group is of the view that this proposal is a serious setback to the ongoing negotiations as it undermines the Treaty and affects its credibility as an effective disarmament and non-proliferation regime as well as its universalisation. The Group further hopes that the above proposal and the advocacy of exceptions to nuclear tests would be withdrawn in the interest of an early conclusion of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1293
3 February 1995

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH/SPANISH

LETTER DATED 1 FEBRUARY 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CHILE TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT MADE ON BEHALF OF 23 COUNTRIES

I have pleasure in requesting you to arrange for the statement I made on behalf of 23 countries at the opening meeting of the 1995 session of the Conference on Disarmament, on 31 January 1995, to be distributed as an official document of the Conference.

(Signed) Jorge BERGUÑO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Chile
to the Conference on Disarmament

STATEMENT MADE TO THE CONFERENCE BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF CHILE ON 31 JANUARY 1995 ON BEHALF OF 23 COUNTRIES

I would like to make the following statement in the name of Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Finland, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

The Conference on Disarmament is, once more, confronted with the need to reach a consensus leading to the expansion of its membership, in order to respond to its own decisions and to the successive resolutions by the United Nations General Assembly demanding a substantial enlargement of its composition.

Now, for the first time, although retaining in the annual resolution on the report of the Conference on Disarmament (resolution 49/77 C) a paragraph urging the Conference to make every effort to reach a solution on the expansion of its membership by the beginning of 1995, the General Assembly has adopted a specific resolution on the issue of expansion (resolution 49/77 B).

The more specific resolution on expansion contains, in its operative paragraphs, terms of reference which, while recognizing the legitimate aspirations of all candidate countries, recommend a significant expansion of the conference's composition which would then include at least 60 countries. In a logical order, the United Nations General Assembly resolution draws attention to the relevant documents intended to guide us in this endeavour:

The report of 12 August 1993 of the Special Coordinator for membership, already acknowledged by the General Assembly since it had been introduced at its forty-eighth session as an integral part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament;

The subsequent statement made by the Special Coordinator on 23 August 1993, recommending a dynamic solution to the question of membership;

The report of the Conference on Disarmament on its 1994 session, reflecting the intention of the Conference to reinstate its own procedures providing for periodic review of its membership.

We are confident that the appropriate procedures will be found to materialize the consensus embodied in the above-mentioned resolutions into a formal decision of the Conference on Disarmament on its composition for the 1995 session.

The completion of this long-delayed process must be achieved with a certain sense of urgency, now, within certain constraints of time that brook no extension. In this context, resolution 49/77B enhances the merits of an enlarged membership, in order to negotiate, on the solid basis of more representative participation, a comprehensive test-ban treaty and other important agreements requiring universal adherence.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1294
3 February 1995

Original: ENGLISH

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON THE AGENDA AND ORGANIZATION OF WORK FOR THE 1995 SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

(adopted at the 695th plenary meeting on 3 February 1995)

1. There is an understanding in the Conference that, at the outset of its 1995 session, the Conference decides to adopt as its agenda for 1995 the agenda of its 1994 session, pending consideration of the Report, and without prejudice to its outcome, of the Special Coordinator on the review of the agenda to be appointed by the Conference:

1. Nuclear test ban.
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.
4. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.
5. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
6. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
7. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.
8. Transparency in armaments.
9. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

2. The Conference agrees, without prejudice to any future decisions on the organizational framework of other items, to begin its work immediately on "Nuclear test ban". For this purpose, the Conference reestablishes the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban with its 1994 mandate (CD/1238). The Conference will consider the possibility of reestablishing as soon as possible the Ad Hoc Committees on "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", "Effective

international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and "Transparency in armaments" as well as any other Ad Hoc Committees which may be agreed on following further consultations.

3. The Conference also decides, in the framework of agenda item 2 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", to continue consultations on a mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on the "Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" with a view to its establishment as early as possible. Depending on the outcome of Ambassador Shannon's consultations, the situation will be reviewed and the advisability of appointing a Special Coordinator will be considered.

4. The Conference also recalls its decision to intensify its consultations on its improved and effective functioning, including its decision to carry out consultations on the issues of its membership and agenda. For this purpose, I confirm that I shall appoint a Special Coordinator to conduct consultations on the issue of membership, taking into full account General Assembly resolution 49/77 B, and a Special Coordinator on the review of the agenda as mentioned in paragraph 1 above.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1295
22 February 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 FEBRUARY 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ROMANIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE ACT ADOPTED BY THE PARLIAMENT OF ROMANIA ON THE IMPORT AND EXPORT REGIME FOR STRATEGIC GOODS

I have the honour to forward to you the attached Act No. 93 for the Approval of Government Ordinance No. 31 of 29 July 1994 on the import and export regime for strategic goods, adopted by the Parliament of Romania on 10 November 1994.

I would be most grateful if, in accordance with the established practice, you would arrange for this Act to be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and circulated to all delegations, both of member and of observer States.

(Signed) Romulus NEAGU
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Romania

Annex

THE PARLIAMENT OF ROMANIA

THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES　　THE SENATE

ACT

for the approval of Government Ordinance No. 31 of 29 July 1994 on the import and export regime for strategic goods

The Parliament of Romania passes the following Act:

Single Article. - Government Ordinance No. 31 of 29 July 1994 on the import and export regime for strategic goods, adopted under Article 1 (f) of Act No. 72/1994 on empowering the Government to issue ordinances, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, No. 218 of 16 August 1994, is hereby approved with Article 16 (4) amended to read as follows:

"(4) The persons referred to in Article 4 are required to retain the documents relating to the strategic goods imported or exported for 15 years".

This law was adopted by the Senate at its meeting on 31 October 1994, in accordance with the provisions of Article 74 (2) of the Constitution of Romania.

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE

OLIVIU GHERMAN

This Act was adopted by the Chamber of Deputies at its meeting on 1 November 1994, in accordance with the provisions of Article 74 (2) of the Constitution of Romania.

for THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

IOAN GAVRA

Bucharest, 10 November 1994
No. 93

GOVERNMENT OF ROMANIA

Ordinance

on the import and export regime for strategic goods

In exercise of the powers conferred by article 107, paragraphs (1) and (3), of the Constitution of Romania and article 1 (f) of Act No. 72/1994 on commissioning the Government to issue Ordinances

THE GOVERNMENT OF ROMANIA

issues the following

Ordinance

Section I

General provisions

Article 1

1. Imports and exports of strategic goodare controlled under the provisions of the present Ordinance and may be authorized by licence.

2. Under the provisions of the present Ordinance "strategic goods" means:

(a) Industrial goods, high technologies and services that may have dual use (civilian and military);

(b) Weaponry, munitions and other military equipment;

(c) Goods, high technologies and services related to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missiles carrying such weapons;

(d) Other goods, technologies and services under special control due to Romania's international commitments.

3. The strategic goods lists are decided upon by means of Government Decisions.

Article 2

The control of imports and exports of strategic goods is carried out in compliance with:

(a) The fundamental directions of Romania's foreign policy;

(b) National economic and security interests;

(c) The objective of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles carrying such weapons and other strategic goods used for military purposes;

(d) The international agreements to which Romania is party;

(e) The international commitments Romania has pledged to abide by;

(f) The principle of cooperation with countries that promote a similar non-proliferation policy in this domain.

Article 3

The National Agency for the Control of Strategic Exports and Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, as the Government's specialized body, hereinafter called the Agency, is responsible for implementing the provisions of the present Ordinance.

Article 4

1. The provisions of the present Ordinance are applicable to all persons undertaking import or export activities relating to strategic goods.

2. "Person" means any natural or legal person residing in Romania, including public authorities.

Article 5

1. Commercial arrangements concluded with foreign parties consisting of acquisitions or sales of strategic goods which do not enter Romanian customs territory are also subject to the present Ordinance.

2. The transit of strategic goods through Romania shall be carried out in accordance with the customs legislation.

Article 6

1. The import and export of strategic goods shall be carried out on the basis of individual import and export licences.

2. General licences may be issued for commercial arrangements with parties in countries that promote principles similar to those referred to in Article 2.

Article 7

1. The importers and exporters of strategic goods shall apply on their own behalf at the Agency for import and export licences.

2. The licence applications shall be processed within 30 days from the day the applicant submitted the documents stipulated in the present Ordinance. In special cases this period may be extended by 15 days.

3. The persons referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are required to advise the Agency of any changes or differences noted in documents, as well as those noted when the strategic goods are handed or taken over, compared with the details stated in the licence. When such changes or differences alter the conditions for which the licence was issued, it shall be cancelled and the statement made about the changes or differences may be considered as a new application for a licence.

Article 8

1. Licences shall be valid for six months from the day they were issued. When an extension is necessary, the documents mentioned in the present Ordinance shall be re-confirmed by the authorities that issued them.

2. The licences can be used only by the applicant and cannot be transferred.

Article 9

The applications for licences shall be made, and the data and information regarding the import or export of strategic goods furnished by the importer or exporter shall be provided, by the natural persons or, depending on the case, by the managers of the legal persons.

Article 10

The importer or exporter has the obligation to declare the strategic goods and tender them for inspection only at the designated customs points.

Section II

The control regime with respect to parties in countries that have regulations similar to those in the present Ordinance

Article 11

1. Import Certificates and Delivery Control Certificates shall be used for imports of strategic goods from parties in countries that have regulations similar to those in the present Ordinance and promote principles corresponding to those in Article 2. The certificates shall be issued by the Agency.

2. By issuing the Import Certificate the Agency agrees to:

(a) Certify that the importer's statements are accurate and notify the legally empowered authorities of any untruth regarding the ultimate use of the strategic goods;

(b) Ensure that the use of strategic goods corresponds to the stated ultimate use;

(c) Enable the authority in the exporting country to make the necessary inspections regarding the import-related arrangements and actions;

(d) Provide to the authority in the exporting country, upon request, a Delivery Control Certificate;

(e) Observe, in accordance with international conventions, any other prerequisites specifically related to transfers of strategic goods.

3. The Delivery Control Certificate confirms that the goods have arrived at their destination in the quantities and with the technical specifications stated in the supporting documents and have been used as stated.

4. The importer shall deliver to his partner, upon request, the Delivery Control Certificate and a copy of the Customs Import Statement.

5. The General Customs Directorate shall provide further evidence that the import has been completed, upon the exporter's request for such confirmation.

Article 12

1. In cases of exports of strategic goods to parties in countries that have regulations similar to those in the present Ordinance and promote principles corresponding to those in Article 2, the exporter shall request the importer to obtain an Import Certificate or its equivalent from the authority in the importing country. This document shall be annexed to the application for an export licence.

2. The exporter shall obtain from his partner, after the goods have been delivered but not later than three months from the day of delivery, the Delivery Control Certificate or an equivalent document confirming that the goods have arrived at their destination. The exporter shall submit this document to the licensing authority within four months of the day of arrival.

Section III

The control regime with respect to parties in countries that do not have regulations similar to those in the present Ordinance

Article 13

No supporting document is required for the issuance of import licences for imports of strategic goods from countries that do not have regulations pursuant to the present Ordinance.

Article 14

1. The issuance of export licences for exports of strategic goods to countries that do not have regulations similar to those in the present Ordinance shall be subject to the submission of a declaration from the ultimate user or consignee and the importer or purchaser, in which they commit themselves to use the goods only in their country for the stated purposes and to enable the authority in the exporting country to inspect the ultimate destination.

2. The declaration shall be in writing and signed by the authorized legal representatives of the ultimate user or consignee and the importer or purchaser, as well as by those responsible for certifying the respective documents.

Section IV

The structure and functions of the control system

Article 15

1. The import and export control regime laid down in this Ordinance is operated by the Agency in collaboration with the ministries referred to in Article 17.

2. The structure and functions of the Agency shall be decided upon by Government Decision.

3. In order to carry out its responsibilities pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article, the Agency is empowered to:

(a) Examine and approve applications for imports and exports of strategic goods;

(b) Verify the accuracy and trustworthiness of statements made by persons importing or exporting strategic goods;

(c) Verify, in books and on site, when necessary, the relevant features of the arrangements, developments and completion of the imports or exports of strategic goods, as well as the observance of their ultimate use;

(d) Cooperate with its counterpart authorities abroad in accordance with the provisions of the present Ordinance;

(e) Evaluate and accept, when appropriate, the Import Certificate or its equivalent issued by the competent authorities in the importer's country, in order to issue the licence;

(f) Issue the Import Certificate and the Delivery Control Certificate for imports of strategic goods;

(g) Periodically inform the Government of Romania with respect to the commercial arrangements subject to the present Ordinance;

(h) Order the cessation of imports or exports of strategic goods, when the provisions of the present Ordinance are violated;

(i) Initiate, together with the competent institutions, the updating of strategic goods lists, in compliance with the international commitments Romania has pledged to abide by.

Article 16

1. In order to carry out its responsibilities the Agency shall set up a Control Unit, comprising its own specialists and, when necessary, other experts. The Agency shall bear the costs incurred for the control activities.

2. The Control Unit of the Agency shall have free access to the necessary documents and information required, irrespective of the holder, in order to carry out its control duties.

3. The persons referred to in Article 4 are required to provide the Agency, when it so requests and within the terms it decides, with any assistance or information necessary and to enable the Control Unit to gain access to their offices or company premises in connection with the examination of the relevant aspects of the arrangements, developments and completion of the import or export transactions, as well as to inform it about the use of the strategic goods subject to control.

4. The persons referred to in Article 4 are required to retain the documents relating to the strategic goods imported or exported for five years.

5. If, in carrying out its duties, the Agency obtains information that may constitute state, company or commercial secrets, it must respect its obligation of secrecy and disclose such information only to the competent authorities.

Article 17

1. An Inter-Ministry Council shall be established, within the strategic goods import and export control system, comprising representatives, at least at director level, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Industries, Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Waters, Forests and Environmental Protection, Ministry of Justice, Department for European Integration and the Agency.

2. The Inter-Ministry Council shall examine and may approve the applications for licences for imports and exports of strategic goods, in keeping with the provisions of the present Ordinance.

3. The Ministry of Trade shall issue the licences, on the basis of the approval given by the Inter-Ministry Council.

Article 18

In order to have his application processed, an applicant for a licence who undertakes to import or export nuclear-related goods shall submit the import or export authorization issued by the Ministry of Waters, Forests and Environmental Protection - National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control, pursuant to the legislation in force.

Article 19

In order to have his application processed, an applicant for a licence to import or export weaponry, munitions or other military equipment shall submit the import or export authorization issued by the Ministry of National Defence, Department of Military Procurement, on the basis of its special regulations.

Article 20

1. In order to have applications for imports or exports of strategic goods processed, the Ministry of the Interior, Economic Investigation Division, shall provide the Agency with the information obtained directly as well as from other institutions empowered to gather intelligence in order to reveal crimes.

2. The Ministry of the Interior, Economic Investigation Division or the special criminal investigation institutions shall carry out proper research at the Agency's request, and shall inform it of legal measures to be taken.

Article 21

The Ministry of Finance, General Customs Directorate, shall have, in accordance with its responsibilities, the following tasks:

(a) To verify the supporting documents for imports and exports of strategic goods;

(b) To prevent, identify, inspect and penalize any infringements of the present Ordinance;

(c) To halt and inspect vehicles and in-transit goods, inspect trains, offices, commodities and warehouses, request identification evidence, inspect books and correspondence, request documents and information regarding imports or exports of strategic goods from any institution or person;

(d) To inspect the observance of the transportation and warehousing conditions of the strategic goods that are under customs custody;

(e) To secure the cooperation and assistance of any persons involved in the sale, distribution or transportation of the strategic goods in order to implement the provisions of the present Ordinance;

(f) To take possession of strategic goods that are under investigation until its completion.

Section V

Other provisions

Article 22

1. The Agency shall organize, with the assistance of the competent ministries, company awareness programmes on the objectives, principles, rules and procedures of the strategic goods import and export regime.

2. The Agency shall provide, upon request, specialized consultancy services to companies and persons interested in undertaking the import or export of strategic goods.

Article 23

The Agency's international cooperation pursuant to Article 15 shall have the following aims:

(a) To exchange reciprocal information and consult regarding the applications for imports or exports when there may be substantial evidence proving that the strategic goods could be used otherwise than stated;

(b) To update and harmoniously implement the regulations in this domain, including the strategic goods lists;

(c) To notify any infringements of the control regime committed by a foreign national or company so that it may be penalized by the competent authorities abroad.

Section VI

Penalties

Article 24

Any violation of the provisions of the present Ordinance regarding imports or exports of strategic goods as well as regarding the trustworthiness of the statements which by law constitutes a crime shall be punished by imprisonment in compliance with the provisions of the Penal Code.

Article 25

Any issuance of import or export licences for strategic goods without the observance of the provisions of the present Ordinance shall be considered and penalized as an administrative, disciplinary or penal offence, according to the law.

Article 26

Any failure to abide by the ultimate destination of the strategic goods, as stated in the documents, shall be considered an offence and shall carry a fine of between 500,000 and 5 million lei.

Article 27

Any violation of the provisions of Article 10, Article 12 (2) and Article 16 (3) shall be considered an offence, unless it is not considered a crime under the laws in force and shall be subject to a fine of between 100,000 and 500,000 lei.

Article 28

The Control Unit of the Agency or the customs officers shall consider and levy a fine, when applicable, for the offences referred to in Articles 26 and 27.

Article 29

Act No. 32/1968, on ascertaining and penalizing offences, is applicable to the offences referred to in the present Ordinance, excluding those referred to in Articles 25, 26 and 27.

Article 30

If the violation of the provisions of the present Ordinance may seriously prejudice the strategic goods imports and exports regime or the fulfilment of the commitments Romania has pledged to abide by, the competent authorities shall revoke the licence and, when necessary, the authorization to undertake the import and export of strategic goods.

Section VII

Final provisions

Article 31

1. The structure and functions of the Agency shall be modified and amended by Government Decision.

2. The strategic goods lists referred to in Article 1 shall be periodically updated by Government Decision.

3. The forms for Import Licence, Export Licence, Import Certificate and Delivery Control Certificate shall be decided upon by Government Decision.

4. The list of countries to which the provisions of Section II apply shall be decided upon and periodically updated by Government Decision.

Article 32

1. The present Ordinance shall take effect 15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette of Romania.

2. Any contrary provision shall be repealed on the day the Ordinance comes into force.

Bucharest, 29 July 1994, No. 31

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1296
7 March 1995

Original: ENGLISH

PROGRESS REPORT TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ON THE FORTIETH SESSION OF THE AD HOC GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS TO CONSIDER INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE MEASURES TO DETECT AND IDENTIFY SEISMIC EVENTS

1. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, initially established in pursuance of the decision taken by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 22 July 1976, held its fortieth formal session from 20 February to 3 March 1995, in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Dr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden. This was the thirty-second session of the Group, convened under its new mandate by the decision of the Committee on Disarmament at its 48th meeting on 7 August 1979.

2. The Ad Hoc Group is open to all Member States of the Conference on Disarmament. It is also open on a standing basis to all non-Member States which have been invited upon their request by the Conference on Disarmament to participate in its work. Accordingly, scientific experts and representatives of the following Member States of the Conference on Disarmament participated in the session: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, the Russian Federation, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

3. Scientific experts and representatives from the following non-Member States of the Conference on Disarmament participated in the session: Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Israel, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey.

4. During the session 49 papers containing information on national investigations related to the work of the Group were presented by experts from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mongolia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

5. The Group reviewed initial results from its Third Technical Test, GSETT-3, which successfully began full-scale operations on 1 January 1995. A report summarizing the initial experience from the full-scale phase is annexed to this Progress Report.

6. As part of its review of GSETT-3 the Ad Hoc Group conducted in-depth discussions on the results of the three working groups that it has established to deal with the planning, operation and evaluation of the experiment. Several meetings of these working groups were held during the session. Summaries of the status of the efforts and plans of these three working groups are included in annex 3.

7. The Group also discussed its future plans for GSETT-3. The Group agreed that continuation of GSETT-3 for an extended period of time along the operational plans outlined in CD/1254 would be important to progressively modify the system to meet the International Monitoring System (IMS) design, as decisions are made by the CD on the seismic component of a future IMS. This would also ensure continued training of an international staff and continued provision of practical advice to the CD. In addition, the GSE could cooperate in experiments to demonstrate the synergy between the seismic IMS and other non-seismic IMS components, if requested by the NTB AHC. For financial planning purposes, countries participating in GSETT-3 should be prepared to support their national facilities and communications links at least through 1996.

8. It was noted that facilities are incomplete for some of the stations envisioned as part of the GSETT-3 monitoring network (CD/1254). It is of particular importance to ensure financial resources for continuous data transmission, and for operation of other facilities during GSETT-3. Countries are encouraged to assist by providing technical and financial assistance in these areas to other countries whose participation is essential.

9. The Ad Hoc Group received and appreciated a briefing from the Chairman of the Nuclear Test Ban Committee's Working Group on Verification. Upon invitation by the Chairman, the Ad Hoc Group gave a presentation to the Working Group of the GSETT-3 experiment.

10. As reported in the last Progress Report (CD/1270), the Ad Hoc Group received a letter from the International Seismological Centre (ISC) requesting receipt of GSETT-3 seismic bulletins and phase data on a regular basis. Addressing the broader issue, the Ad Hoc Group agreed that GSETT-3 data will be a valuable resource to the broader seismological community, and supported the concept that National Data Centers could, at their discretion, be the conduit through which GSETT-3 data are provided to individuals and organizations not directly participating in GSETT-3. In this capacity, the UK has offered to provide the requested data to the ISC in a manner agreeable to both parties.

11. The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 7 to 18 August 1995. The main task during the next session will be to review and evaluate results from the full-scale phase of GSETT-3. The Group is prepared to meet during the second part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament, if so requested by the CD in view of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. A draft work programme for the next session is presented in Annex 1. The work programme will be tailored to meet as much as practicable the information needs of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and its Working Group on Verification.

Annex 1

Draft work programme for the next (41st) session

1. Continued review of results from the full-scale GSETT-3 testing:
    - IDC reports
    - National reports by participants
2. Continued evaluation of the GSETT-3 system and its results
3. Discussion of modifications to GSETT-3 procedures needed in the light of these experiences
4. Presentation and review of national investigations into relevant matters
5. Discussion of future plans
6. Answer possible questions relating to GSETT-3 from the NTB Ad Hoc Committee or its Working Group on Verification
7. Submission of a progress report to the CD
8. Other matters

Annex 2

Status of GSETT-3 Station and Gamma Data Commitments as of 1 March 1995

COUNTRY	Alpha Stations Envisaged by GSE	Beta Stations Offered	Station commit-ment Status	Data Available to IDC	Gamma Data Committed
Argentina	1	1	committed	1994/ July 1995	yes
Australia	5	11	committed	1994	yes
Austria	0	1	lacking	unknown	-
Belgium	0	0	not applicable	not applicable	yes
Bolivia	1		lacking	unknown	-
Botswana	1		lacking	unknown	-
Brazil	1	2	committed/ lacking	1994/1995	-
Bulgaria	0	1	committed	July 1995	yes
Canada	6	18	committed	1994	yes
Cen. Afr. Republic	1	-	committed	1994	-
Chile	0	1	committed	-	-
China	3	0	committed	unknown	-
Cook Islands	0	1	committed	1994	-
Colombia	1	0	committed	mid-1995	-
Costa Rica	0	1	committed	-	-
Czech Republic	0	1	committed	1994	yes
Denmark	1	-	lacking	July 1995	yes
Egypt	1	0	lacking	unknown	-
Ethiopia	0	1	committed	-	-
Finland	1	2	committed	1994	yes
France	1	0	committed	Jan.1995	yes
Germany	1	9	committed	1994	-
Hungary	0	1	committed	1994	yes

Iceland	0	1	committed	-	-
India	1	0	committed	May 1995	-
Indonesia	1	-	lacking	unknown	-
Iran	1	1	lacking	June 1995	yes
Israel	0	1	committed	March 1995	yes
Italy	0	2	committed	1994	yes
Ivory Coast	1	-	committed	March 1995	-
Japan	1	7	committed	1994	yes
Kazakhstan	1	-	lacking	unknown	-
Kenya	1	-	lacking	unknown	-
Rep. of Korea	1	-	lacking	unknown	-
Mexico	1	2	lacking	unknown	-
Mongolia	1	1	committed	unknown	-
Netherlands	0	1	committed	1994	yes
N.Africa (XAF)	1	-	lacking	unknown	-
New Zealand	0	1	committed	1994	yes
Norway	3	1	committed	1994	yes
Pakistan	1	1	committed	1995	-
Papua New Guinea	1	-	committed[1]	Jan. 1995	-
Paraguay	1	-	committed	1994	-
Peru	0	1	committed	1995	yes
Philippines	0	1	committed	-	-
Poland	0	1	lacking	unknown	yes
Portugal	0	1	committed	-	-
Romania	0	1	committed	1995	yes
Russian Federation	5	5	committed	1994	-
Seychelles	0	1	committed	-	-
South Africa	1	1	committed	1994/1995	yes
Spain	1	2	committed	Jan. 1995	yes
Sweden	1	0	committed	Jan. 1995	yes
Switzerland	0	1	committed	Jan. 1995	yes
Thailand	1	-	committed	Feb. 1995	-
Turkey	1	-	committed	unknown	-

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[1] *Envisaged Alpha Station currently used as Beta station*

Turkmenistan	1	-	committed	unknown	-
Ukraine	0	1	committed	-	-
United Kingdom	0	2	committed	1994	yes
United States	7	12	committed	1994	yes
Western Samoa	0	1	committed	1994	-
Zambia	0	1	committed	Jan. 1995	-
TOTAL (Committed)	60(49)	102(95)			26

Current GSETT-3 Network



This map shows the stations of the GSETT-3 network contributing data to the IDC as of 1 March 1995. Alpha stations are indicated by large symbols and Beta stations by small ones.

Annex 3

Summary report on initial results of the GSETT-3 full-scale test

Executive Summary

On 1 January 1995, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) Third Technical Test, GSETT-3, successfully began full-scale operations. GSETT-3, which has been described in detail in document CD/1254, is an effort to develop, test and evaluate new concepts for an experimental International Seismic Monitoring System (ISMS).

The initial phase of the GSETT-3 full-scale operations has been successful. The seismic monitoring system has achieved the objectives of acquiring, storing and disseminating raw data. In addition many of the processed data products are available to the National Data Centers (NDCs). This is due to the dedicated efforts of many individuals, both in and outside of the GSE. Particularly noteworthy is the demonstrated capability of the International Data Center (IDC) to adhere to the strict processing schedule and the high quality requirements, even in instances of very heavy processing load due to large earthquake sequences.

While it is still too early to draw any definite conclusions, it can already be stated that GSETT-3 is fulfilling many of the requirements originally specified for the test. Some technical problems have been encountered, but they have largely been solved along the way without serious interruptions or degradation of performance. The participation is still somewhat less than originally envisaged, but it is steadily increasing. There is also a need for further developments of technical facilities at many seismograph stations and NDCs. Likewise, some existing data communication links are inadequate and must be improved. These developments are given high priority.

The GSETT-3 system is already providing an infrastructure in the form of technical facilities, including education and training of personnel, which could facilitate the implementation of a monitoring system for verifying compliance with a CTBT. GSETT-3 is also providing experience with data and services that will be needed by the national verification programs of the participating States for monitoring a CTBT.

GSETT-3 has proven its usefulness for work conducted by the IMS expert group in evaluating options for future monitoring systems. GSETT-3 is already providing data relevant to assessing the performance of various seismic monitoring networks.

Initial experience from GSETT-3 has reconfirmed that GSETT-3 will, as anticipated in CD/1254, provide the following information relating to a future International Seismic Monitoring System (ISMS):

- The station network designed for GSETT-3 represents a basis for the design of the ISMS.
- The functions and products which have been designed for the IDC is the guide to the functions and products required from the ISMS for monitoring purposes.
- The detailed instructions and procedures developed for GSETT-3 will form a good foundation for an Operating Manual for the components of the ISMS.
- The experiences in GSETT-3 will be useful in estimating system capabilities, costs and staffing requirements, and in specifying

requirements for ISMS components such as seismic stations and facilities, telecommunications equipment, and hardware and software for NDCs and the IDC.

The system to be tested during GSETT-3 is evolutionary in nature. Additional stations, improved instrumentation and new processing methods are expected to be incorporated as the test progresses. The GSE will conduct an ongoing assessment of various system components during GSETT-3. Results will be continually incorporated into the system to improve its performance so that the system will be capable of providing the Conference on Disarmament with material relevant to the establishment and operation of a future system for monitoring of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

As GSETT-3 evolves, the results will be regularly reported to the Conference on Disarmament, and the GSETT-3 experience is expected to represent a major contribution to the advancement of a future international monitoring system under a CTBT.

1. Background

The concepts to be tested during GSETT-3 include: a single centralized International Data Center, a specifically designed high-quality seismographic network, and a modern communications system providing continuous data to the international center. As stated in CD/1254, the primary objectives of GSETT-3 are to:

- develop and test new concepts for an experimental ISMS, building upon previous experience;
- provide a practical basis upon which to furnish the Conference on Disarmament with timely technical information;
- develop an experimental system that can evolve and adapt to support future requirements that may be specified for an International Seismic Monitoring System.

GSETT-3 is an unprecedented global effort to conduct an operationally realistic test of rapid collection, distribution and processing of seismic data. It incorporates the most advanced seismic sensors, global communications, data management and data processing technologies currently available. The GSETT-3 system will need to process and disseminate a volume of data about 10 times greater than that of any existing seismic monitoring system.

While the scope of GSETT-3 is limited to seismic monitoring, the GSETT-3 system design is flexible enough to incorporate the collection, archiving and distribution of data from non-seismic techniques, for example, radioactivity, hydroacoustics and infrasound.

This report summarizes the initial experience from GSETT-3 full-scale testing. It is based on contributions from the three GSETT-3 working groups on Planning, Operations and Evaluation.

2. GSETT-3 Participation

The global seismograph network envisaged for GSETT-3 is a two-tiered network comprising the so-called Alpha and Beta seismograph stations. The Alpha stations are designed and located to provide detection and initial location of seismic events throughout the world. The station waveform data are telemetered continuously to the IDC.

The Beta stations provide supplementary data, so that events can be located and characterised with improved accuracy. Data from Beta stations are not telemetered continuously to the IDC, but waveform segments can be retrieved automatically.

2.1 Alpha stations

As of its 39th session, the GSE envisaged an Alpha station network of 59 stations (out of which 24 are arrays), and the GSE had received formal commitments for 38 of these stations. Since that time, contacts have been made by various means with all prospective Alpha station host countries that had not yet made a commitment to participate in GSETT-3. In this regard, many missions in Geneva were visited to see what could be done to solicit further commitments. This and other work has so far resulted in eleven additional commitments, so that the number of committed Alpha stations as of 1 March 1995 is 49. Out of these, 32 are currently contributing data to the IDC, and all but two of these are fully incorporated into the IDC processing.

2.2 Beta stations

Many countries, and especially those participating in the GSE sessions, offered Beta stations for use in GSETT-3 at an early date, and as of the 39th GSE session, information had been received for a total of 93 planned such stations, out of which 76 were committed. Additional candidate Beta stations around the world that meet the technical requirements and that are of potential usefulness to GSETT-3 have been identified, in cooperation with the Federation of Digital Seismograph Networks (FDSN) and its member networks.

The GSE is seeking formal commitments for participation in GSETT-3 in direct contact with the authorities of the host countries of such candidate stations. So far, the GSE chairman has written letters to 29 such countries, and positive responses containing commitments by the respective authorities have been received from 11 countries. In some of these cases, some clarification is needed to establish whether the commitment given applies to stations that are actually accessible in conformity with Beta station requirements.

To date, the GSE has received information on 102 planned Beta stations, out of which 95 have been committed. It is conceivable that the number of Beta stations that will ultimately be used during GSETT-3 might approach 150.

A map and a table showing the current Alpha and Beta station participation status by country are annexed to the progress report.

3. GSETT-3 Operations

The highlight of GSETT-3 operations since the last GSE session was the successful start of the full-scale test at 0000 UT 1 January 1995. This start followed a flurry of activity during the last four months of 1994 as participating nations readied their seismic stations and communications links, and the GSETT-3 IDC prepared to accept the new data and a more demanding processing schedule through the acquisition of new hardware, upgraded software and highly-qualified staff. A detailed, statistical overview of IDC operations and, to a lesser extent, of station and NDC participation is provided in the bi-weekly IDC Performance Reports. These reports are available on-line electronically from the IDC World-Wide Web (WWW) server on the Internet.

3.1 Status

As Table 1 shows, there are now 28 countries actively participating in GSETT-3 by submitting data to or retrieving data from the IDC. Data are now arriving at the IDC from stations on every continent. The number of

Alpha stations sending continuous, near-realtime data to the IDC has increased from 12 to 32 since August 1994, while the number of Beta stations accessed by the IDC has grown from 21 to 44.

Communications links and data transmission software from the Alpha stations to the IDC (often through a communications hub at an NDC) have performed adequately during the full-scale test. Acquisition of data from Beta stations using direct dial-up and GSE automatic Data Request Manager (AutoDRM) message via electronic mail have proved less reliable due to problems at the IDC, NDCs and stations, though performance continues to improve. Eleven NDCs (Canada, Finland, France, Italy, New Zealand, Japan, Romania, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States) are submitting Gamma data in the form of independent seismic event lists. These data are typically more than a month behind realtime, and are not yet being submitted or received by the IDC in a uniform, robust manner.

	1 Feb 1994	20 Aug 1994	20 Feb 1995	Plan
Participating Nations	10	13	28	>40
Alpha Stations	6	12	32	59
Beta Stations	13	21	44	~150
Coverage	European	Sparse Global	Global	Global
NDCs Sending Gamma Data	1	5	11	20-30
Volume of Data/Day to IDC	0.2 Gbytes	1.5 Gbytes	2.5 Gbytes	>5 Gbytes
Data Days/Week	2	3	7 (24hrs/day)	7 (24 hrs/day)
REB Events/day	20	20	60	>100
REB Events Total (since Aug 1993)	1500	2700	6800	
IDC Staff (int'l)	27(0)	27(0)	47(9)	50(9)

Table 1

Starting 1 January 1995, the IDC began full-scale operation seven days per week and 24 hours per day. The IDC produces automatically an Alpha Event List (AEL) based on signals detected in the realtime, continuous waveform data from Alpha stations. Beta waveform segments, which are based on AEL event locations, are then automatically retrieved and an Alpha/Beta event list (ABEL) is produced. The waveform data is then interactively reviewed to produce a Reviewed Event Bulletin (REB). The target times for completing the automatic bulletins are 1 hour (AEL) and 4 hours (ABEL) after event time. The target for the REB is two days after the end of the data day. With minor exceptions these target times have been adhered to.

To accommodate the increased number of stations and processing of data seven days per week, the IDC has added over 30 new computers, 200 Gbytes of disk, a new high-speed computer communications system and upgraded data processing and handling software, since the last GSE session. The most significant new processing software supports intelligent retrieval of Beta data, calculation of seismic body-wave magnitudes and improved interactive analysis.

The number of staff at the IDC is now 47. International staffing and training at the IDC has been an important objective of the Working Group on Operations. Following the last GSE session offers were extended to successful applicants for positions within the IDC and there are now nine international visiting experts working at the IDC. Preparation of IDC products has focused on determining the location, depth and magnitude of seismic events world-wide that can be observed at three or more stations. The IDC products are being made available according to schedule, with an automated event list completed within about 1.5 hours of the occurrence of the event, and a high-quality analyst Reviewed Event Bulletin (REB) available within 2 days after the day of the event.

There are an average of about 60 events in the REB each day. However, there have been a number of significant earthquakes during the first weeks of the full-scale test (e.g., Kobe Japan on 16 January, Columbia on 8 January, northern New Zealand on 5 February), and the aftershocks of these have resulted in REBs containing far more events, as many as 205 for the single data day of 6 February. That the system could handle the increased load, in particular on the data analysis staff, of these swarms is encouraging.

The GSETT-3 IDC is not providing identification of detected seismic events, but will soon calculate and compile agreed parameters characterizing the detected signals that may assist participating countries in identifying the source of each seismic disturbance.

Estimates of the magnitude threshold, at the 90% confidence level, for detection of an event by three stations in the current Alpha network range from mb 3.1 in Northern Europe up to mb 4.7 in the southern oceans. Typical location uncertainties for events within 2000 km of the closest station are between 40 and 50 km. Completion and calibration of the station network and processing software will reduce this uncertainty.

The data access facilities at the IDC continue to improve. Since the last session, the IDC has installed a GSE AutoDRM for electronic mail access to the IDC database. The IDC has also provided an initial capability for NDCs to establish Subscriptions. Subscriptions are standing orders for classes of data that satisfy criteria specified by the NDC and are forwarded automatically to the NDC. A preliminary World-Wide Web (WWW) server has been installed which allows NDCs to review the state-of-health, raw data, products and documentation for the GSETT-3 system over the Internet. Facilities have also been set up whereby the required information can be obtained by logging into the IDC and extracting information from the database using Structured Query Language (SQL) commands.

To achieve the full potential of the GSETT-3 experiment, additional work is needed on all aspects of the monitoring system. As deficiencies and problems have been identified and remedied, the reliability of stations, communications and IDC processing has improved. The overall operational reliability of the system and the quality of the products will be maximized if station problems are promptly reported to the personnel responsible for the fixing them, and if there is a prompt response from the station operators, regardless of the day of the week. Problem reporting procedures are documented in the Operations Manuals.

3.2 Operational Plans

A number of significant changes are expected to take place within the IDC over the next six months. It is expected that between 10 and 15 new Alpha stations, 20 - 40 new Beta stations, and Gamma data from additional NDCs will be available during this period. More robust Alpha, Beta and Gamma acquisition software will be an important accompaniment to these new data sources. New computer hardware for data processing and mass store capable of archiving over five Terabytes of data (expandable to 25 Terabytes) will be installed at the IDC.

Major upgrades to the signal processing software, automatic association and location software and knowledge-base (through IDC, Working Group on Operations, and NDC research) are expected to improve the quality of the automated event lists and ease the burden on the analysts. The IDC products will be expanded to include a number of additional event characterization parameters, including new seismic magnitudes and spectral measurements. All IDC data and products will be more easily accessible through expanded data access features within AutoDRM, Subscriptions and the WWW server.

4. GSETT-3 Documentation

The GSETT-3 Documentation comprises the plan for GSETT-3, technical instructions, factual description of facilities to be used, an evaluation plan and numerous technical annexes. This voluminous documentation forms the basis for operations manuals and procedures for GSETT-3. It will also contain technical summaries of IDC and station operations and ongoing evaluation results during GSETT-3. Previous experience has shown that documentation of this type is essential.

A draft version of the GSETT-3 Documentation was produced and distributed in advance of the 39th GSE session in August 1994. Based on discussions during the 39th session, as well as review of material during the past months, an updated version of this documentation has now been compiled. This updated version was distributed during this session, as CRP/243.

The structure of the overall documentation, comprising four volumes and five annexes, remains unchanged since the 39th session. New versions are now available of Volume One - Plan, Volume Two - Operations, and Volume Four - Evaluation, whereas Volume Three - Facilities, will be reassessed with respect to format and content, and was thus not distributed at this session. New versions of all five annexes have been produced.

Documentation on Operations (Volume 2: Seismic Station Operations Manual, National Data Center Operations Manual, International Data Center Operations Manual), Formats and Protocols for Data Exchange (Annex 3), the GSE Database Structure and Attributes (Annex 4) and the GSETT-3 System Security Plan (Annex 5) has been revised and redistributed as a result of comments and suggestions made by the GSE and practical experience gained through GSETT-3 operations.

The GSETT-3 Documentation in its current version provides a solid basis for the conduct and evaluation of GSETT-3. It is desirable, however, to streamline the documentation with respect to format and style, coherency and completeness, as well as removal of unnecessary overlap between the volumes, so as to meet the high expectations of the GSE for the GSETT-3 Documentation. It is thus anticipated that CRP/243/Rev.1 could appear before the start of the 41st GSE session. This revision can then also benefit from the discussions during the 40th GSE session.

A complete GSETT-3 Documentation produced along these lines should provide the CD with material that would be highly relevant to the establishment and operation of a future treaty monitoring system. In fact, much relevant material in this regard is already contained in the current version of the GSETT-3 Documentation in the form of operational manuals for stations, National Data Centers and the International Data Center.

5. Evaluation

The Working Group on Evaluation (WGE) visited the IDC in early January and made a preliminary evaluation of GSETT-3 at that stage, just after the start of the formal phase of the Test. This evaluation has since been updated in the light of subsequent improvements and to reflect the many national contributions presented during the GSE session, as well as the latest IDC Performance Reports.

5.1 Stations and communications

A preliminary analysis of the 32 Alpha stations that were on-line to the IDC on February 20 shows that almost all are of high quality, with low noise levels and consequently a high capacity for detection of seismic signals from distant events. The reliability of these stations is not yet as high as desirable but has steadily improved over the past few months. A wide variety of instrumentation is employed at the current Alpha stations, but although some instrumental effects can be observed these cannot yet be shown to affect detection capability. Many Beta stations are now available but their usage has been low and thus it is not yet possible to assess their capabilities or usefulness in terms of improving event locations. This situation is expected to improve rapidly. An initial assessment shows that the most effective use of some of the existing stations will require the application of corrections to take into account the effects of local geology.

The data communications links employed for the current system appear to be highly reliable and this conclusion is independent of the physical means (satellite, fibre optic, cable, etc) employed for the link. If there are interruptions of the links, procedures to recover missing data have been implemented in most cases. Dedicated links to many countries have excess capacity and could handle a greater data volume, or number of stations, if desired. Several countries are improving access to their Beta stations, and the procedures to retrieve data from them are being thoroughly tested and improved.

5.2 National Data Centres

A brief survey was conducted of those National Data Centres (NDCs) which were participating in GSETT-3 at the end of December 1994. Questionnaires were sent to nineteen NDCs, fourteen of which responded. The information from the completed questionnaires was collected and used to make a preliminary assessment of the performance of the NDCs. It was apparent that a major part of the effort was being put into the monitoring of alpha and beta stations, ensuring the provision of seismological waveform data from their stations to the IDC. Almost all NDCs, with only three exceptions, reported having an Internet connection. This means that the NDCs can access the IDC data base using a variety of techniques. Beta data can be retrieved from some NDCs and stations by the IDC using Internet and dial-up links. The development of an AutoDRM capability at several NDCs has proved to require a considerable amount of effort, and not all have completed this work. All NDCs are willing to be active in GSETT-3 Evaluation work and it is planned that NDC Evaluation Reports will be sent to the IDC starting in March 1995. The information contained in such reports will be used to evaluate many aspects of the GSETT-3 experiment, not the least being costs. It is very difficult to give any idea of definitive costs at this stage but detailed cost information should be available from these NDC Evaluation Reports and this will enable the WGE to make cost estimates for the different components of the GSETT-3 system.

5.3 IDC Quality Assurance Evaluation

Two representatives of the Working Group on Evaluation visited the IDC in Arlington, Virginia the 7th to the 26th of November. The purpose of the visit was to assess the readiness of the IDC to start full scale operation on 1 January, i.e. to perform the Quality Assurance Evaluation described in Annex 1 of Volume 4 of the GSETT-3 documentation. The IDC was then, and is still, under development and some items had to be postponed and others only partially tested, but most items were addressed.

According to the results from the Quality Assurance Evaluation the IDC was ready on 1 January 1995 to process data from the alpha/beta network expected to be in operation at that time. The international manning at the IDC had reached the envisaged level. Reviewed Event Bulletins would be, and are being, generated daily and on schedule and the basic statistics necessary for the evaluation of GSETT-3 are being accumulated. However, for data days containing an excessive number of events the time schedule was sometimes relaxed. The first version of the AutoDRM was tested in a simulated full scale test in which 7 NDCs took part; it proved to be very efficient in answering requests for large data volumes. An internet hypermedia browser called Mosaic is also available to the NDCs for accessing the IDC archive. All processing steps from the collection of data to the interactive analysis are automatic, with the exception of transferring waveforms to the permanent archive. One to two operators are sufficient to monitor the automatic processing so a high degree of automation has been reached. The design of the IDC is modular and well suited for future modifications and improvements of the system. The total cost of the IDC is $9 million from October 1994 until September 1995, including development, communications, and the support of visiting international staff.

Furthermore, there exists a development plan to increase the capability of the IDC to process data from the larger alpha/beta network envisaged in 1995 and to address questions relevant to an operational IDC such as security, data authentication and full documentation.

5.4 Seismological Issues

It is difficult, given the rapid evolution of the network and frequent changes in procedures, to conduct seismological evaluations in a consistent manner, but some very preliminary conclusions can be drawn from a number of national reports. Those countries that have compared the detection and subsequent processing carried out by the IDC with that which they conduct have found quite good agreement in most cases, although it is clear that the tuning of such processing is a lengthy procedure. It still appears, however, that a high proportion of the phase readings in the bulletins are made by human analysts rather than the automatic processes, and that the latter require further refinement. Similarly, a rather high proportion of the events appearing in the bulletins are created by the analysts, although the ratio of automatic events to those finally appearing in the bulletins has decreased following the adoption of more conservative event definition criteria. National suggestions for more effective criteria are being investigated.

A number of countries have compared locations from their denser national networks with those given in the IDC bulletins. These studies indicate that in most cases the IDC locations are quite good and that the associated error estimates are realistic. Once the gamma data being submitted is actually entered into and available from the IDC database, it will be possible to carry out such analyses in a more systematic manner. Depth estimates in the bulletins are generally good but there were several well-documented instances where the bulletin focal depth was excessive. Several national investigations have compared their magnitudes with those of the IDC and while typically these agree to about half a magnitude unit, it is clear that the issue of magnitudes, and how this will affect assessments of the detection capability of the GSETT-3 network, is an extremely complex one that will require much effort.

Because of the very limited use so far of data from Beta stations, their value for event location and definition is hard to estimate, and a high priority should be given to more effective use of such facilities. Most events appearing in the bulletins are recorded only at teleseismic distances, and the array stations are mostly clearly superior to single stations in terms of detection capability. For the current network, theoretical estimates of detection capability by the IDC appear to be in quite good agreement with national estimates for regions as diverse as western Europe, Japan and New Zealand. These theoretical capabilities vary widely across the globe, reflecting the quite uneven distribution of stations, with coverage so far being quite poor in Africa, much of Asia, and South America.

5.5 Evaluation Plans

Overall, there have been substantial improvements in both capability and procedures during the first two months of 1995, but much work remains

to be done. The WGE intends to improve coordination with both the NDCs and the IDC, and to develop a plan that should lead to firmer conclusions about the present system and how it might be improved. Particular attention will be paid to issues such as capability, costs, the value of Beta stations, and the magnitude consistency problem. A special effort is being made to collect information on national and regional networks and procedures and to establish standard techniques for comparison of event locations and magnitudes from such networks with those produced by the IDC. The WGE will meet again just before the next GSE session in order to provide an up-to-date report on these and other matters.

* * *

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1297
10 March 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 8 MARCH 1995 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING FIVE COMPENDIA OF DOCUMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TO SUPPORT THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS ON A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT)

I have the honour to transmit to you five compendia of CD documents to support the negotiation process on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT):

- the first volume is a compilation of the final records (PVs) of the Conference on Disarmament during its 1994 session relating to the issue of a Nuclear Test Ban;
- the second covers Working Papers (WP) relating to a Nuclear Test Ban submitted in plenary to the Conference on Disarmament during its 1994 session;
- the three volumes cover official documents (working papers) tabled in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban (CD/NTB/WP) in 1994:

Volume I	includes	CD/NTB/WP.34	to	CD/NTB/WP.90;
Volume II	includes	CD/NTB/WP.91	to	CD/NTB/WP.171;
Volume III	includes	CD/NTB/WP.172	to	CD/NTB/WP.205

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for the distribution of the above five volumes to all member and participating non-member State delegations, under cover of a CD number.

(Signed): Andrew McAlister
Minister and Deputy
Permanent Representative to
the Conference on Disarmament

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1298
16 March 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 MARCH 1995 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A PUBLICATION ENTITLED "THE CONVERGING ROLES OF ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, AND PEACE OPERATIONS: OPPORTUNITIES FOR HARMONIZATION AND SYNERGIES"

I have the honour to transmit copies of a new publication in the Canadian series Arms Control Verification Studies, No. 6, entitled "The Converging Roles of Arms Control Verification, Confidence-Building Measures, and Peace Operations: Opportunities for Harmonization and Synergies".

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for the distribution of this publication, under a CD number, to all member and participating non-member State delegations.

(Signed): Andrew McAlister
Minister and Deputy
Permanent Representative to
the Conference on Disarmament

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1299
24 March 1995

Original: ENGLISH

REPORT OF AMBASSADOR GERALD E. SHANNON OF CANADA ON CONSULTATIONS ON THE MOST APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENT TO NEGOTIATE A TREATY BANNING THE PRODUCTION OF FISSILE MATERIAL FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

At the beginning of last year's session, I was tasked with seeking the views of members of the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

As you know, I held numerous consultations, both bilaterally and with groups and reported formally to this plenary on five occasions in 1994. Mid-way through the last session, consensus was reached that the CD was the appropriate forum to negotiate a treaty on this issue. At the end of the session in September, while there was no agreement on a mandate for an ad hoc committee, there was agreement, in principle, that an ad hoc committee be established on this issue as soon as a mandate had been agreed. At that time, the CD asked me to continue consultations on an appropriate mandate for an ad hoc committee in order to enable the convening of this Ad Hoc Committee as soon as possible.

At the beginning of this year's session, the Conference decided to continue consultations on a mandate.

I have since held numerous consultations, and am pleased to report that delegations have agreed that the mandate for such a committee should be based on resolution 48/75L of the United Nations General Assembly, and reads as follows:

> 1. *The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc committee on a "ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".*
>
> 2. *The Conference directs the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.*
>
> 3. *The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1995 session.*

During the course of my consultations, many delegations expressed concerns about a variety of issues relating to fissile material, including the appropriate scope of the Convention. Some delegations expressed the view that this mandate would permit consideration in the Committee only of the future production of fissile material. Other delegations were of the view that the mandate would permit consideration not only of future but also of past production. Still others were of the view that consideration should not only relate to production of fissile material (past or future) but also to other issues, such as the management of such material.

It has been agreed by delegations that the mandate for the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee does not preclude any delegation from raising for consideration in the Ad Hoc Committee any of the above noted issues.

Delegations with strong views were able to join consensus so we could all move forward on this issue. This means that an ad hoc committee on cut-off can be established and negotiations can begin on this important topic. This has for some time been the common objective of all delegations of this Conference.

I have appreciated the productive contribution and support of all delegations in arriving at this result.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1300
24 March 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 MARCH 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A VERBATIM TEXT EXTRACTED FROM A SPEECH GIVEN BY PRESIDENT CLINTON ON 1 MARCH 1995 CONCERNING VARIOUS ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES

I have the honour to forward to you a verbatim text extracted from a speech given by President Clinton on 1 March 1995, concerning various arms control and non-proliferation issues.

Could you please take the appropriate steps to register this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament, and to have it distributed to all member delegations and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(*Signed*): Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador

VERBATIM EXTRACT

Speech given by President William J. Clinton

1 March 1995

The Richard Nixon Center

(Arms Control and Non-proliferation Issues)

Over the past two years, the United States has made real progress in lifting the threat of nuclear weapons. Now, in 1995, we face a year of particular decision in this era - a year in which the United States will pursue the most ambitious agenda to dismantle and fight the spread of weapons of mass destruction since the atom was split.

We know that ours is an enormously complex and difficult challenge. There is no single policy, no silver bullet, that will prevent or reverse the spread of weapons of mass destruction. But we have no more important task. Arms control makes us not only safer, it makes us stronger. It is a source of strength. It is one of the most effective insurance policies we can write for the future of our children.

Our administration has focused on two distinct, but closely connected areas - decreasing and dismantling existing weapons, and preventing nations or groups from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and the means to deliver them. We have made progress on both fronts.

As the result of an agreement President Yeltsin and I reached, for the first time in a generation Russian missiles are not pointed at our cities or our citizens. We have greatly reduced the lingering fear of an accidental nuclear launch. We put into force the START I Treaty with Russia that will eliminate from both our countries delivery systems that carry more than 9,000 nuclear warheads - each with the capacity to incinerate a city the size of Atlanta.

START I, negotiated by two Republican administrations and put into force by this Democratic administration, is the first treaty that requires the nuclear Powers actually to reduce their strategic arsenal. Both our countries are dismantling the weapons as fast as we can. And thanks to a far-reaching verification system, including on-site inspections which began in Russia and the United States today, each of us knows exactly what the other is doing.

And, again, through the far-sighted programme devised by Senators Nunn and Lugar, we are helping Russia and the other newly-independent States to eliminate nuclear forces in transport, safeguard and destroy nuclear weapons and material.

Ironically, some of the changes that have allowed us to reduce the world's stockpile of nuclear weapons have made our non-proliferation efforts harder. The breakup of the Soviet Union left nuclear materials dispersed throughout the newly-independent States. The potential for theft of nuclear

materials, therefore, increased. We face the prospect of organized criminals entering the nuclear smuggling business. Add to this the volatile mix, the fact that a lump of plutonium the size of a soda can is enough to build a bomb, and the urgency of the effort to stop the spread of nuclear materials should be clear to all of us.

That is why from our first day in office we have launched an aggressive coordinated campaign against international terrorism and nuclear smuggling. We are cooperating closely with our allies, working with Russia and the other newly-independent States, improving security at nuclear facilities, and strengthening multilateral export controls.

One striking example of our success is Operation Sapphire, the airlift of nearly 600 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium - enough to make dozens of bombs from Kazakhstan to the United States for disposal. We have also secured agreements with Russia to reduce the uranium and plutonium available for nuclear weapons, and we are seeking a global treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Our patient, determined diplomacy also succeeded in convincing Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and give up the nuclear weapons left on their territory when the Soviet Union dissolved. One of our administration's top priorities was to assure that these new countries would become non-nuclear nations, and now we are also achieving that goal.

Because of the effort, four potential suppliers of ballistic missiles - Russia, Ukraine, China and South Africa - have all agreed to control the transfer of these missiles and related technology, pulling back from the nuclear precipice has allowed us to cut United States defence expenditures for strategic weapons by almost two thirds, a saving of about $20,000 million a year, savings which can be shifted to vital needs such as boosting the readiness of our armed forces, reducing the deficit, putting more police on our own streets. By spending millions to keep or take weapons out of the hands of our potential adversaries, we are saving billions in arms costs and putting it to better use.

Now in this year of decision, our ambition for the future must be even more ambitious. If our people are to know real lasting security, we have to redouble our arms control, non-proliferation and antiterrorist efforts. We have to do everything we can to avoid living with the twenty-first century version of fallout shelters and duck-and-cover exercises to prevent another World Trade Center tragedy.

In just four days we mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Nothing is more important to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons than extending the treaty indefinitely and unconditionally. And that is why I have asked the Vice-President to lead our delegation to the NPT Conference this April and to work as hard as we can to make sure we succeed in getting that indefinite extension.

The NPT is the principal reason why scores of nations do not now possess nuclear weapons; why the doomsayers were wrong. One-hundred and seventy-two nations have made NPT the most widely subscribed arms limitation treaty in history for one overriding reason - it is in their self-interest to do so. Non-nuclear weapon States that sign on to the treaty pledge never to acquire them. Nuclear weapons States vow not to help others obtain nuclear weapons, to facilitate the peaceful uses of atomic energy and to pursue nuclear arms control and disarmament - commitments I strongly reaffirm, along with our determination to attain universal membership in the treaty.

Failure to extend NPT indefinitely could open the door to a world of nuclear trouble. Pariah nations with rigid idealogies and expansionist ambitions would have an easier time acquiring terrible weapons, and countries that have chosen to forego the nuclear option would then rethink their position; they would certainly be tempted to reconsider that decision.

To further demonstrate our commitment to the goals of the treaty, today I have ordered that 200 tons of fissile material, enough for thousands of nuclear weapons, be permanently withdrawn from the United States nuclear stockpile. Two-hundred tons of fissile material that will never again be used to build a nuclear weapon.

A second key goal of ours is ratifying START II. Once in effect, that treaty will eliminate delivery systems from Russian and American arsenals that carry more than 5,000 weapons. The major reductions under START I, together with START II, will enable us to reduce by two thirds the number of strategic warheads deployed at the height of the cold war. At my urging, the Senate has already begun hearings on START II, and I am encouraged by the interest of the senators from both parties in seeking quick action. I commend the Senate for the action taken so far, and I urge again the approval of the treaty as soon as possible.

President Yeltsin and I have already instructed our experts to begin considering the possibility after START II is ratified of additional reductions and limitations on remaining nuclear forces. We have a chance to further lift the nuclear cloud, and we dare not miss it.

To stop the development of new generations of nuclear weapons, we must also quickly complete negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Last month I extended a nuclear testing moratorium that I put into effect when I took office. And we revised our negotiating position to speed the conclusion of the treaty while reaffirming our determination to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile.

We will also continue to work with our allies to fully implement the agreement we reached with North Korea, first to freeze, then to dismantle its nuclear programme, all under international monitoring. The critics of this agreement, I believe, are wrong. The deal does stop North Korea's nuclear programme, and it does commit Pyongyang to roll it back in the years to come.

I have not heard another alternative proposal that is not either unworkable or foolhardy, or one that our allies in the Republic of Korea and Japan, the nations most directly affected, would fail to support.

If North Korea fulfils its commitment, the Korean Peninsula and the entire world will clearly be less threatened and more secure. The NPT, START II, the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, the North Korean Agreement, they top our agenda for the year ahead. There are other critical tasks we also face if we want to make every American more secure, including winning Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, negotiating legally binding measures to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, clarifying the ABM Treaty so as to secure its viability while permitting highly effective defences against theater missile attacks, continuing to support regional arms control efforts in the Middle East and elsewhere, and pushing for the ratification of conventional weapons which, among other things, would help us to reduce the suffering caused by the tens of millions of anti-personnel mines which are plaguing millions of people all across this world.

My friends, this is a full and challenging agenda. There are many obstacles ahead. We cannot achieve it if we give in to a new isolationism. But I believe we can do no less than make every effort to complete it.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1301
27 March 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 MARCH 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A PRESS STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE IN LONDON ON 15 MARCH 1995 REGARDING THE UNITED KINGDOM'S EXPORT MORATORIUM ON ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES

I attach a press statement issued by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London on 15 March 1995, regarding the United Kingdom's Export Moratorium on Anti-Personnel Landmines.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the statement to be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): M.C.S. Weston
Ambassador

EXPORT MORATORIUM ON ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES

Mr. David Davis, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, announced today in the House of Commons that Britain was, with immediate effect, extending the scope of its export moratorium on anti-personnel landmines. The moratorium will now comprise a total ban on the export of non-self-destructing on non-detectable anti-personnel landmines, plus a ban on the export of all types of anti-personnel landmines to countries which have not ratified the United Nations Weaponry Convention.

Today's announcement extends the scope of the moratorium, covering the export of anti-personnel landmines not fitted with a self-destructing mechanism announced on 27 July 1994. The extension has become possible because of Britain's ratification of the 1981 United Nations Weaponry Convention on 13 February. The extended moratorium will be of indefinite duration.

The extension underlines the Government's desire to put an end to trade in non-self-destructing and non-detectable anti-personnel landmines, which are the most dangerous to civilians. It also reflects the Government's support for the principle that only responsible countries should be able to acquire any anti-personnel landmines.

The Government hopes that its decision will set a positive example, which will encourage more countries to ratify the United Nations Weaponry Convention and abide by its provisions.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1302
30 March 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 29 MARCH 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A PUBLICATION CONTAINING PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE CUT-OFF CONVENTION WORKSHOP HELD IN TORONTO, ONTARIO, FROM 16-19 JANUARY 1995

I have the honour to transmit to you this volume which contains the papers presented at the Cut-off Convention Workshop, held in Toronto, Canada, from 16-19 January 1995. The papers are presented to allow those who could not be present to benefit from the results of the Workshop.

I trust these papers will be of assistance to delegations as we commence negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for distribution of the volume to all member and participating non-member State delegations, under cover of a CD number.

(Signed): Gerald E. Shannon
Ambassador
and
Permanent Representative

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1303
30 March 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 22 MARCH 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BULGARIA, COORDINATOR OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN GROUP, ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT CONCERNING SLOVAKIA'S REQUEST TO FILL IN THE SEAT OF THE FORMER CZECH AND SLOVAK FEDERAL REPUBLIC IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

The Eastern European Group supports Slovakia's legitimate request, submitted in January 1993, to fill in the seat of the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, which meets a wide support in the Conference on Disarmament.

The Eastern European Group holds the view shared by many other States that this is a specific and separate case, not related to the issue of expansion of the CD.

I would be grateful if you could bring this request to the attention of the CD so that the Conference may be in the position to take a decision at its earliest convenience.

(*Signed*) Valentin Dobrev
Ambassador,
Head of the Bulgarian Delegation to the CD
Coordinator of the Eastern European Group

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1304
4 April 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 3 APRIL 1995 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A PUBLICATION ENTITLED "VERIFYING A FISSILE MATERIALS CUT-OFF: AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL DIVERSION SCENARIOS"

I have the honour to transmit to you a new Canadian publication, entitled "Verifying a fissile materials cut-off: an exploratory analysis of potential diversion scenarios".

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for its distribution to all member and participating non-member State delegations, under cover of a CD number.

(Signed) Andrew McAlister
Minister and Deputy
Permanent Representative to
the Conference on Disarmament

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1305
7 April 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 APRIL 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE UNITED STATES STATEMENT CONTAINING THE UNITED STATES DECLARATION ON SECURITY ASSURANCES

I have the honour to forward to you the text of the United States Statement containing the United States Declaration on Security Assurances.

Could you please take the appropriate steps to register this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament, and to have it distributed to all member delegations and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed): Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador

The United States believes that universal adherence to and compliance with international conventions and treaties seeking to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a cornerstone of global security. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a central element of this regime. 5 March 1995 was the twenty-fifth anniversary of its entry-into-force, an event commemorated by President Clinton in a speech in Washington on 1 March 1995. A Conference to decide on extension of the Treaty will begin in New York City on 17 April 1995. The United States considers the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without conditions as a matter of the highest national priority and will continue to pursue all appropriate efforts to achieve that outcome.

It is important that all Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons fulfil their obligations under the Treaty. In that regard, consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must be in compliance with these undertakings in order to be eligible for any benefits of adherence to this Treaty.

As a nuclear-weapon State the United States has consistently recognized its responsibilities under the Treaty, and the importance of addressing the special needs of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty with regard to measures that would alleviate their legitimate security concerns. To that end, the President directed that the United States review its policies on security assurances for such non-nuclear-weapon States and that consultations be held with other nuclear-weapon States on this important topic.

Bearing the above considerations in mind, the President declares the following:

The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.

Aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, against a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would create a qualitatively new situation in which the nuclear-weapon State permanent members of the United Nations Security Council would have to act immediately through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, to take the measures necessary to counter such aggression or to remove the threat of aggression. Any State which commits aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons or which threatens such aggression must be aware that its actions are to be countered effectively by measures to be taken in accordance with the United Nations Charter to suppress the aggression or remove the threat of aggression.

Non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have a legitimate desire for assurances that the United Nations Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, would act immediately in accordance with the Charter, in the event such non-nuclear-weapon States are the victim of an act of, or object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

The United States affirms its intention to provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act of, or an object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

Among the means available to the Security Council for assisting such a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would be an investigation into the situation and appropriate measures to settle the dispute and to restore international peace and security.

United Nations Member States should take appropriate measures in response to a request for technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance from a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act of aggression with nuclear weapons, and the Security Council should consider what measures are needed in this regard in the event of such an act of aggression.

The Security Council should recommend appropriate procedures, in response to any request from a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is the victim of such an act of aggression, regarding compensation under international law from the aggressor for loss, damage or injury sustained as a result of the aggression.

The United States reaffirms the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack, including a nuclear attack, occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1306
7 April 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 APRIL 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM DECLARATION ON SECURITY ASSURANCES

I should be grateful if you would make the necessary arrangements to have the text of the United Kingdom Declaration on Security Assurances registered as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and circulated to all members and non-members of the CD. I enclose a copy of the text of the United Kingdom Declaration.

(Signed): M.C.S. Weston
Ambassador

UNITED KINGDOM DECLARATION ON SECURITY ASSURANCES

The Government of the United Kingdom believe that universal adherence to and compliance with international agreements seeking to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are vital to the maintenance of world security. We note with appreciation that 175 States have become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

We believe that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime which has made an invaluable contribution to international peace and security. We are convinced that the Treaty should be extended indefinitely and without conditions.

We will continue to urge all States that have not done so to become parties to the Treaty.

The Government of the United Kingdom recognize that States which have renounced nuclear weapons are entitled to look for assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. In 1978 we gave such an assurance. Assurances have also been given by the other nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Recognizing the continued concern of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that the assurances given by nuclear-weapon States should be in similar terms, and following consultation with the other nuclear-weapon States, I accordingly give the following undertaking on behalf of my Government:

The United Kingdom will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.

In giving this assurance the United Kingdom emphasizes the need not only for universal adherence to, but also for compliance with, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this context I wish to make clear that Her Majesty's Government do not regard their assurance as applicable if any beneficiary is in material breach of its own non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

In 1968 the United Kingdom declared that aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a qualitatively new situation in which the nuclear-weapon States which are Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council would have to act immediately through the Security Council to take the measures necessary to counter such aggression or to remove the threat of aggression in accordance with the United Nations Charter, which calls for taking "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace". Therefore, any State which commits aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons or which threatens such aggression must be aware that its actions are to be countered effectively by measures to be taken in accordance with the United Nations Charter to suppress the aggression or remove the threat of aggression.

I, therefore, recall and reaffirm the intention of the United Kingdom, as a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State, party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

This Security Council assistance could include measures to settle the dispute and restore international peace and security, and appropriate procedures, in response to any request from the victim of such an act of aggression, regarding compensation under international law from the aggressor for loss, damage or injury sustained as a result of the aggression.

If a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a victim of an act of aggression with nuclear weapons, the United Kingdom would also be prepared to take appropriate measures in response to a request from the victim for technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance.

The United Kingdom reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack, including a nuclear attack, occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

6 April 1995

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1307
7 April 1995

ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 7 APRIL 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF FRANCE TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A DECLARATION BY FRANCE ON SECURITY ASSURANCES

I would be grateful if you would kindly register this declaration as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all the delegations of member States and States with observer status.

(Signed) G. ERRERA
Permanent Representative of France
to the Conference on Disarmament

The question of security assurances given by the nuclear Powers to non-nuclear States is a major issue for my delegation, firstly because it corresponds to a real expectation on the part of the non-nuclear countries, particularly those which, in signing the NPT, have renounced the goal of acquiring atomic weapons, secondly because our special responsibilities as a nuclear Power are at stake, and lastly because this issue has taken on new significance since the end of the cold war, as awareness has grown of the threat posed to all by the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It is in order to respond to this expectation, to shoulder its responsibilities and make a contribution to efforts to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons, that France has decided to adopt the following measures.

First, it wishes to clarify and reaffirm the negative security assurances it gave in 1982. Specifically, France reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on it, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a State, in alliance or association with a nuclear-weapon State.

In our view it is natural that the beneficiaries of these assurances should be the signatories to the NPT - that is, the vast majority of the countries of the world - since they have entered into a formal commitment to non-proliferation.

In response to the requests made by a large number of countries, France has also sought to harmonize the content of its negative assurances to the maximum extent possible with those of the other nuclear Powers. We are happy that this effort has succeeded. The declarations concerning negative security assurances made by France, the United States, Russia and the United Kingdom, are now practically identical.

Secondly, France has decided for the first time to give positive security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. This decision became both possible and desirable following France's accession to the NPT. Consequently, France considers that any act of aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would threaten international peace and security. France recognizes that it is legitimate for the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT to be assured that the international community, and first and foremost the United Nations Security Council, would react immediately in accordance with the obligations under the Charter in the event that they were victims of or threatened with aggression using nuclear weapons.

Bearing these considerations in mind, France makes the following declaration:

France, as a permanent member of the Security Council, undertakes in the event of aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT to bring the matter before the Security Council without delay and to work within the

Council to ensure that the Council takes immediate steps to provide the requisite assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to a State that is the victim of an act of aggression or the threat thereof.

France reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack, including a nuclear attack, occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

In this field too we welcome the fact that the content of these positive assurances was the subject of close consultation with the other nuclear Powers.

Thirdly, together with the four other nuclear Powers, France has decided to put before the United Nations Security Council a draft resolution which is pathbreaking in many respects, and which reflects our resolve to respond to the expectations of the international community in a comprehensive, collective and concrete manner. Comprehensive, because for the first time, a draft resolution encompasses both negative assurances and positive assurances. Collective, because the five nuclear Powers are co-sponsoring such a resolution for the first time. Concrete, because for the first time a Security Council resolution spells out the steps that the Security Council might take in the event of aggression, in particular as regards dispute settlement, humanitarian assistance and compensation to victims.

The draft resolution formally reaffirms the need for all States parties to the NPT to respect their obligations fully. This is not a case of petitio principii, but the reiteration of a fundamental rule. The draft also emphasizes the desirability of universal accession to the NPT.

The decisions I have just announced reflect our determination to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, and especially the NPT, of which it is the keystone. It is our hope and firm conviction that the initiatives we have taken will help to achieve that end.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1308
7 April 1995

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH AND FRENCH

LETTER DATED 6 APRIL 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF FRANCE, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THEIR JOINT DECLARATION IN CONNECTION WITH THE NPT

We have the honour to forward to you the text of a Declaration by France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, in connection with the NPT. This Declaration will be made at the plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament on 6 April 1995.

We should be grateful if you would kindly take the appropriate steps to register this document as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament, and to have it distributed to all member delegations and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed): Gérard Errera
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of France to the
Conference on Disarmament

(Signed): Grigori V. Berdennikov
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the Russian Federation
to the Conference on
Disarmament

(Signed): Sir Michael Weston
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the United Kingdom
to the Conference on
Disarmament

(Signed): Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the United States to
to the Conference on
Disarmament

DECLARATION BY FRANCE, RUSSIA, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES IN CONNECTION WITH THE NPT

We wish to express our continuing strong support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), our desire that the forthcoming Review and Extension Conference in New York should decide on its indefinite and unconditional continuation in force and our determination to continue to implement fully all the provisions of the Treaty, including those in article VI.

We welcome the fact that the nuclear arms race has ceased and that, in keeping with the fundamental changes that have taken place with respect to international security, important steps have been taken towards nuclear disarmament, as a result of the agreements on deep reductions in the nuclear armaments of the Russian Federation and the United States of America as well as the significant reductions made by France and the United Kingdom in their nuclear weapon programmes.

We welcome the important progress made at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in the multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty to which we are all contributing actively.

We also welcome the establishment by the CD of an Ad Hoc Committee with a mandate to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We urge that the negotiations begin forthwith.

We underline the importance of the harmonized security assurances which we have given to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT against the use of nuclear weapons, as well as the commitments as regards the provision of appropriate assistance to a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT victim of aggression or threat of aggression with nuclear weapons. We believe that these strengthen international peace and security.

We solemnly reaffirm our commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, which remains our ultimate goal.

We reaffirm our determination to continue to negotiate intensively, as a high priority, a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, and we pledge our support for its conclusion without delay.

We call upon all States Parties to the NPT to make the Treaty permanent. This will be crucial for the full realization of the goals set out in article VI.

We call upon all States that are not Parties to the NPT to accede to it soon, thereby contributing to the enhancement of both regional and global security.

A truly universal and fully implemented Treaty is in the interests of all.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1309
7 April 1995

ENGLISH
Original: CHINESE AND ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 APRIL 1995 FROM THE HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF CHINA'S NATIONAL STATEMENT ON SECURITY ASSURANCES

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the official Chinese and English text of "China's National Statement on Security Assurances", which was delivered on 5 April 1995 by the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China.

I would be grateful if the text of this statement could be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Sha Zukang
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary for
Disarmament Affairs
Head of the Delegation of the
People's Republic of China to
the Conference on Disarmament

CHINA'S NATIONAL STATEMENT ON SECURITY ASSURANCES

5 April 1995

For the purpose of enhancing international peace, security and stability and facilitating the realization of the goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, China hereby declares its position on security assurances as follows:

1. China undertakes not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances;

2. China undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances. This commitment naturally applies to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or non-nuclear-weapon States that have undertaken any comparable internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices;

3. China has always held that pending the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances. China strongly calls for the early conclusion of an international convention on no-first-use of nuclear weapons as well as an international legal instrument on assuring the non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

4. China, as a Permanent Member of the Security Council of the United Nations, undertakes to take action within the Council in order that the Council take appropriate measures to provide, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, necessary assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon State that comes under attack with nuclear weapons, and impose strict and effective sanctions on the attacking State. This commitment naturally applies to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or any non-nuclear-weapon State that has undertaken any comparable internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices, in case of an aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against the State;

5. The "positive security assurance" provided by China, as contained in paragraph 4, does not in any way compromise China's position as contained in paragraph 3 and shall not in any way be construed as endorsing the use of nuclear weapons.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1310
CD/NTB/WP.236
7 April 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 APRIL 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDIA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT OF THE GROUP OF 21 ON THE CTBT NEGOTIATIONS

In my capacity as Coordinator of the Group of 21 on agenda item "Nuclear Test Ban" I have the pleasure in submitting herewith a Group of 21 Working Paper entitled "Statement of the Group of 21 on the CTBT negotiations".

I would be grateful if this Working Paper could be distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament as well as a Working Paper of the Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Test Ban.

(Signed): Satish Chandra

Statement of the Group of 21 on the CTBT negotiations

The Group of 21 reiterates its earlier call upon all members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular, the Nuclear Weapon States, for an early conclusion of Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1995, made in CD/1292.

In this context, the Group of 21 notes with disappointment the stand taken by some Nuclear Weapon States on the fundamental article on "Scope" in the rolling text - CD/1273/Rev.1. Their continued support to "exceptions" to the rolling text - CD/1273/Rev.1. Their continued support to "exceptions" to nuclear tests has resulted in little progress on this fundamental article. It raises the question about their commitment to the CTBT and goes against the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB. Furthermore, elaborating too vast a verification network also raises serious doubts about the direction and purpose of the present negotiations. It is obvious that the verification of a future CTBT should be determined by the purpose, scope and nature of the Treaty.

On the Scope of a CTBT, the Group of 21 had made it clear that the CTBT should be for complete cessation of nuclear tests by all States in all environments and for all times. The ban should be comprehensive and no tests should be carried out under any pretext for any reason or justification.

The G-21 is studying the contribution of the International Monitoring System (IMS) Expert Group presented in WP.224/225 as it is a valuable input for the negotiations. The G-21 has also noted the key political and technical issues raised by the Expert Group. The G-21 feels that the vast technical material already prepared by the experts on this subject in the past two years is a sufficient basis for delegations to take political decisions. The Group, therefore, feels that given the slow pace of the negotiations in Working Group 1, there does not appear to be much merit in holding more expert sessions. The experts could be a part of their national delegations. The time has now come to take political decisions in order to achieve progress in textual form in the rolling text.

The Group had made it clear in its earlier Working Papers that the verification system under the future CTBT should be cost-effective. The cost of the organization's activities including verification should be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments adjusted to take into account differences in membership between the United Nations and the organization of a CTBT. Like the entire Treaty, the verification system should be universal in its application, non-discriminatory in character and guarantee equal access to all States. Therefore, in view of the elaborate IMS system being proposed, the Group does not agree with the emphasis placed by some delegations on their "National Technical Means" to judge an ambiguous event. Hence, the Group reiterates its earlier position in CD/1266 that the Technical Secretariat should have the capacity and the responsibility of analysing the data received from the IMS. The organization should be responsible for judgement in this regard. Therefore, the organization of a future CTBT should exchange and analyse all IMS and On-Site Inspection (OSI) data with this aim.

It is the Group's hope that the CTBT should be able to attract universal adherence. The Entry into Force (EIF) should not be complicated to delay the process. EIF made contingent upon ratification by the Nuclear Weapon States would make the CTBT hostage to them as well as a discriminatory treaty. The expansion of CD membership should also not be utilized as a pretext to delay the EIF.

In conclusion, the Group is concerned about the slow pace of the negotiations so far. The Group hopes that the pace of negotiations will be accelerated by an exhibition of political will by all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, especially on the "Scope", so that a CTBT can be concluded in 1995.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1311
10 April 1995

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 10 APRIL 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A DECLARATION DATED 5 APRIL 1995 BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Please issue the necessary instructions for the attached declaration dated 5 April 1995 by a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to be distributed as an official document of the Conference.

(Signed) G. BERDENNIKOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
the Russian Federation to
the Conference on Disarmament

Declaration
by a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (5 April 1995)

Bearing in mind the fundamental significance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, respectful of the legitimate desire of States parties to the Treaty which do not possess nuclear weapons to receive assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against them, and taking into account the provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, has been instructed to make the following declaration:

> "The Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the Russian Federation, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State."

In addition, we should like to emphasize that, as proposed by the President of the Russian Federation at the forty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, efforts have been made to reach agreement on an updated resolution of the United Nations Security Council on security assurances for non-nuclear States. The draft of a resolution on this subject, prepared with the participation of Russian representatives, is being presented to the Security Council for consideration. The thrust of the draft is as follows.

In the event of aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the permanent members of the Security Council - the nuclear-weapon States - will immediately bring the matter before the Council and will seek action by the Council to provide the necessary assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to the State that is a victim of an act of, or the object of the threat of, aggression.

Provision is also made for the possibility of taking appropriate measures in response to a request for technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance from the victim of aggression, and also compensation from the aggressor for loss, damage or injury sustained by the State which is the victim of such an act of aggression as a result of the aggression.

We expect that the adoption of a resolution on this subject by the Security Council will be welcomed with satisfaction by the non-nuclear States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and that it will promote the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, international security and world stability.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1312
11 April 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 APRIL 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF MYANMAR ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT OF THE GROUP OF 21 ON SECURITY ASSURANCES

I have the honour to transmit herewith a Statement of the Group of 21 on Security Assurances.

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for the distribution of this publication, under a CD number, to all member and participating non-member State delegations.

(Signed): U Aye
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

STATEMENT OF THE GROUP OF 21 ON SECURITY ASSURANCES

"It has come to the G 21 knowledge that a draft United Nations Security Council resolution on security assurances has been recently circulated in New York. The G 21 has carefully examined the proposals contained in that draft and would like to make the following preliminary observations.

1. Neither the Conference on Disarmament, nor any country belonging to G 21, has been associated with the drafting of the proposal, notwithstanding the fact that the CD is universally recognized as the sole multilateral negotiating disarmament body.

2. While taking into consideration the positive aspects of the proposal, the G 21 observes that this resolution does not take into account any of the formal objections made in the past by Non-nuclear Weapon States on the restrictive, restrained, uncertain, conditional and discriminatory character of the guarantees already provided.

3. The G 21 reiterates its conviction that duly negotiated security assurances are a legitimate right of Non-nuclear Weapon States. In this context, it notes with disappointment that the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons has not even been re-established during the present session.

4. The Group considers that the terms of its Declaration of 31 March 1994, as reported in document CD/1256, remain valid and merit serious consideration. It is imperative that an unconditional multilaterally-negotiated and legally-binding convention on negative security assurances should be drafted and, to this end, all Members of the CD should display their political will.

5. In this regard, it is worth recalling the great importance that the Heads of State and Government of the non-aligned countries attach to a multilateral and legally-binding convention governing this issue as expressed during their tenth summit in Jakarta, in 1992, and reiterated by the non-aligned Foreign Ministers in Cairo, in May 1994, when they stated that 'security assurances to Non-nuclear Weapon States against the use of threat of use of nuclear weapons could contribute positively to addressing some of the dangers inherent in the presence of nuclear weapons' and 'called upon the Conference on Disarmament to reach an urgent agreement on an internationally binding convention'.

6. At the same time, the G 21 considers it necessary that the Security Council gives positive assurances to Non-nuclear Weapon States that should go beyond a mere reiteration of the principles of the United Nations Charter.

7. Furthermore, the G 21 reiterates its conviction that Article 51 of the United Nations Charter should not be interpreted as legitimizing the use of nuclear weapons.

8. The G 21 is deeply convinced that all aspects relating to nuclear weapons issues are interrelated and that the only effective security guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons lies in the total elimination of such weapons. Pending which, it is for the Nuclear Weapon States to provide security assurances to Non-nuclear Weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in an internationally and legally-binding form."

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1313
13 April 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 13 APRIL 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BULGARIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE DECLARATION OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA ON THE ADOPTION ON 11 APRIL 1995 OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 984 ON SECURITY ASSURANCES

I have the honour to forward to you the attached Declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria on the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 984 on Security Assurances on 11 April 1995.

I would be most grateful if, in accordance with established procedure, this Declaration could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and circulated to all delegations participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed): Valentin DOBREV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Bulgaria
Head of Delegation

DECLARATION OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA ON THE ADOPTION OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 984 ON SECURITY ASSURANCES

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria welcomes the adoption by the United Nations Security Council on 11 April 1995 of Resolution 984 and the respective statements made by each of the nuclear weapon States on the security assurances of non-nuclear-weapon States.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes with appreciation the willingness of the five permanent members of the Security Council in case of aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT, to bring the matter to the Security Council and to provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT, that is a victim, or an object of a threat of such aggression. This is a collective response to the aspirations of the States that have forsworn the nuclear weapons under this Treaty, to receive security assurances by the Security Council and its nuclear-weapon State permanent members.

Resolution 984 is a new step of progress on this important issue and an appropriate point of departure for negotiating a future legally binding international instrument on the provision of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

12 April 1995

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1314
31 May 1995

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 30 MAY 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF ARGENTINA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FORWARDING A STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA ISSUED FOLLOWING THE EXPLOSION OF A NUCLEAR DEVICE BY CHINA ON 15 MAY 1995

The Permanent Mission of the Argentine Republic to the international organizations in Geneva presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and requests it to distribute the following text on Thursday 1 June as an official document:

> "The Argentine Republic associates itself with the strong international protest against the explosion of a nuclear device by the People's Republic of China on 15 May. In that context, it deplores the attitude of the Government of the People's Republic of China, which stands in contrast to the decision of the international community to move forward along the path of effective nuclear disarmament.
>
> "The Chinese test is particularly regrettable in view of the occasion on which it was conducted - immediately after the Conference for the review and extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, which reached agreement on the indefinite extension of the Treaty and on a declaration of principles, to which China assented, calling on States to 'exercise utmost restraint' with regard to nuclear tests.
>
> "Nuclear explosions are not conducive to the early conclusion, within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT), which the international community has recognized as a priority objective for the strengthening of peace and security in the world."

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1315
2 June 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 1 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY, ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY OF THE WHITE HOUSE ON 15 MAY 1995, CONCERNING AN UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TEST CONDUCTED BY CHINA

Attached is the text of a statement by the Press Secretary, issued by the Office of the Press Secretary of the White House on 15 May 1995, concerning an underground nuclear test conducted by China.

I would be grateful if you would issue this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants in the work of the CD.

(*Signed*): Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

May 15, 1995

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

Today, China conducted an underground nuclear test at the Lop Nur test site in northwest China. The United States deeply regrets this action, coming only days after the successful conclusion of the NPT Extension Conference in New York where China agreed to exercise "utmost restraint" in nuclear testing pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty. We urge China to refrain from further nuclear tests and to join the other nuclear powers in a global moratorium as we work to complete a CTB Treaty at the earliest possible time.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1316
7 June 1995

ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 1 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF TURKEY ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A STATEMENT MADE BY THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF TURKEY ON 17 MAY 1995 CONCERNING THE CHINESE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION ON 15 MAY 1995

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Turkey to the United Nations Office at Geneva and the other international organizations in Switzerland presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to communicate to it hereunder a translation of the statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey on 17 May 1995 concerning the explosion of a nuclear device on the initiative of the People's Republic of China on 15 May 1995.

"The explosion of a nuclear device by the People's Republic of China, which took place immediately after the decision on the indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty, is, leaving aside the doubts raised as to the proper application of the Treaty, a disappointment in the light of the work that has been carried out for the conclusion of a treaty which will completely prohibit nuclear tests.

"Turkey, which has already expressed its opinion in the past on the occasion of previous nuclear tests, wishes to express its profound concern once again at the harmful effects that the continuation of these tests may have for the environment, public health and safety, which are of fundamental importance for the future of mankind."

The Permanent Mission of Turkey would be grateful if the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament would be kind enough to distribute this text as an official document of the Conference.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1317
7 June 1995

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

NOTE VERBALE DATED 6 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A STATEMENT MADE BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON 15 MAY 1995 IN CONNECTION WITH A NEW NUCLEAR TEST CONDUCTED BY CHINA

The Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference and has the honour to forward a statement made by a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on 15 May 1995 in connection with the new nuclear test carried out by the People's Republic of China.

The Permanent Mission would be grateful if the secretariat would take appropriate steps to issue this statement as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to the delegations of all member States of the Conference and non-member States of the Conference participating in its work.

STATEMENT BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION CONCERNING THE NEW CHINESE NUCLEAR TEST

According to information received, an underground nuclear test was carried out in China on 15 May 1995. This is the fourth nuclear explosion carried out in China in a period of over two years during which the other nuclear Powers have been exercising restraint and jointly observing the moratorium they have declared on such tests.

This action by China prompts regret and concern, all the more so as it was taken after the successful conclusion of the Conference of States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in New York, which adopted by consensus the historic decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely.

Furthermore, this action is not conducive to the creation of a favourable atmosphere around the multilateral negotiations in Geneva concerning the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear testing.

It is to be hoped that China will reconsider its approach to nuclear tests and refrain from further testing. That would constitute a real contribution to the successful conclusion of the Geneva negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and would promote the strengthening of international security.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1318
8 June 1995

Original: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 7 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF NEW ZEALAND ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE RESPONSE OF THE NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE TO THE UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST CONDUCTED BY CHINA ON 15 MAY 1995 AT LOP NOR

The New Zealand Permanent Mission to the United Nations Office at Geneva presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and requests it to distribute the following text describing the response of the New Zealand Government and people to the underground nuclear weapon test conducted by China on 15 May at Lop Nor.

"The New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs issued a public statement on 16 May in which he conveyed the sense of extreme shock felt by all New Zealanders at the news of the Chinese test. The Minister said that the action should be 'strongly condemned' coming as it did immediately after the decision in New York to make the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty permanent.

"The New Zealand Government believes that China's failure to declare a moratorium on its nuclear testing programme runs counter to China's responsibility as a major Power and permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. There can be no justification for any testing, especially now that China and the other nuclear weapons States have agreed to a deadline for completion of this Conference's negotiations no later than 1996.

"The strong protest of the New Zealand Government and people has been conveyed directly to the Chinese authorities in both Beijing and Wellington. New Zealand has urged China to heed the many calls made in relation to this latest test and to announce a permanent moratorium on all nuclear testing pending the conclusion of the CTBT and its entry into force."

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1319
15 June 1995

ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 14 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BELGIUM TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY BELGIUM CONCERNING THE CHINESE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION OF 15 MAY 1995

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the statement by Belgium concerning the Chinese nuclear explosion of 15 May 1995.

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for it to be distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Baron Alain Guillaume
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

best copy available

STATEMENT BY BELGIUM CONCERNING THE CHINESE NUCLEAR TEST OF 15 MAY 1995

On the occasion of the resumption of the work of the CD, the Government of Belgium would like to say how pleased it is at the success of the review and extension Conference for the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty which has just taken place in New York. We believe that above and beyond the decision taken there to extend the Treaty indefinitely - thus securing the foundations of international security in the future - its success is due to the fact that the Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament were also adopted. These are designed to serve as guidelines for all our future activities and they also specify that the nuclear Powers should exercise "utmost restraint" with respect to nuclear tests. In the light of these principles, the fact that - on the very day after they were adopted by consensus - China proceeded to conduct a new nuclear test is absolutely shocking and indeed provocative, and my Government cannot but deplore this fact, for it runs truly counter to the spirit of our negotiations. At the same time, I would say that paradoxically this event, far from slowing down negotiations on the CTBT, underlines the urgent need for their completion. While regretting the event, let us therefore at the same time draw the lesson from it.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1320
15 June 1995

Original: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 15 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF NEW ZEALAND ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE NEW ZEALAND PRIME MINISTER, THE RT. HON. JIM BOLGER, TO THE NEW ZEALAND PARLIAMENT ON 14 JUNE 1995 CONCERNING THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE TO RESUME NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTING ON MORUROA ATOLL IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

The New Zealand Permanent Mission to the Office of the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to attach a statement by the New Zealand Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Jim Bolger, to the New Zealand Parliament on 14 June concerning the decision of the Government of France to resume nuclear weapon testing on Moruroa Atoll in the South Pacific.

The New Zealand Permanent Mission should be grateful if the Secretariat would distribute this text as an official document of the Conference.

FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTING

STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE BY THE PRIME MINISTER

14 JUNE 1995

I am sure the House will wish to join with me in deploring the announcement by the French President this morning that France would be resuming nuclear testing in the Pacific.

The French Government is flouting world opinion if it goes ahead with a resumption of testing. President Chirac's decision runs counter to the outcome of the recent Nuclear Non-Proliferation Conference, at which the nuclear powers were asked to exercise "utmost restraint" in the lead-up to a test ban treaty.

The decision will be greeted with outrage by our neighbours in the South Pacific. We have already spoken to the Australians, current Chair of the South Pacific Forum, and we will be in touch with all the countries of the region to discuss what response the region can make as a whole. In recent years relations between France and the region have improved, following suspension of testing by President Mitterrand. This decision again calls into question France's role in the region.

The Government has taken every opportunity to make known its opposition to a resumption of testing. I have already told this House of the discussions I had in Paris with President Chirac prior to his taking office. Vice-President Gore was also present. I followed this up on my return to New Zealand by writing to President Clinton asking if the possibility of France sharing United States simulation technology could be explored. My understanding was that this would remove the need for further testing at Moruroa; it is unfortunate that the French authorities do not seem to have taken this possibility further.

I understand that it has been suggested by President Chirac that New Zealand had been informed in advance of his announcement that France was about to resume nuclear testing. This is not the case. We were not forewarned of the decision. As recently as last week our Ambassador in Paris made representations to the French authorities that they should not resume testing. Now that they have decided to resume, our Ambassador will be urging the French Government to reconsider. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has this morning spoken to the French Foreign Minister urging reconsideration.

As to steps that we will now take in response to the announcement, we have decided to freeze elements of our military cooperation with France other than in activities with a humanitarian purpose, such as search and rescue in the Pacific and United Nations peacekeeping. Among the activities involved are:

a planned visit by HMNZS Waikato, Endeavour and Wellington to Noumea in November;

a platoon exchange with French forces in New Caledonia in September;

a RNZAF Staff College visit to New Caledonia in September;

visits to New Zealand by French naval vessels and aircraft.

There will be a review of any military procurement activities involving French suppliers.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs will not proceed with a planned visit to New Caledonia for VJ Day commemorations. Contacts involving other Ministers will be reviewed.

On the multilateral front, it is my Government's intention to raise this issue at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. In conjunction with our South Pacific Forum partners, we will also be looking at other ways of expressing our opposition, including at the United Nations in New York. We will of course take full advantage of other opportunities as they arise to register our views direct with the French Government.

Let me conclude by saying that it is not too late for France to reconsider its position. There is a great deal at stake. I am sure that I can speak for all members of this House, and for the people of New Zealand in urging the Government of France to reconsider its decision.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1321
16 June 1995

Original: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 15 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF ITALY AS CURRENT WESTERN GROUP COORDINATOR ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A LETTER FROM THE FORMER WESTERN GROUP COORDINATOR ON BEHALF OF THE WESTERN GROUP CONCERNING THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC'S APPLICATION FOR CD MEMBERSHIP

The Permanent Mission of Italy to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference and - on behalf of the Group of Western Countries - has the honour to forward a letter addressed to the former CD President, Ambassador D.D.C. Don Nanjira, from the former Western Group Coordinator, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar, concerning the Slovak Republic's application for CD membership.

The Permanent Mission of Italy would be grateful if the secretariat would take the appropriate steps to issue the above letter as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to delegations of all member States of the Conference and non-member States of the Conference participating in its work.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

Geneva, Switzerland

OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR

7 June 1995

Dear Ambassador Don Nanjira,

I am writing to you on behalf of the Western Group of the Conference on Disarmament to inform you that the Group supports and endorses the Slovak Republic's application for CD membership.

The Western Group shares the view expressed by the Eastern Group in CD Document 1303 of 30 March 1995, that Slovakia's membership application has wide support within the CD and that Slovakia presents a unique case that is unrelated to the question of CD Membership Expansion.

On behalf of the Western Group, I request that the Slovak Republic's membership application, which has been before the CD for a considerable length of time, be decided without further delay.

Sincerely,

Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador
Western Group Coordinator

Ambassador Dr. D.D.C. Don Nanjira
President of the Conference on Disarmament
Palais des Nations
Geneva

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1322
19 June 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY, ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY OF THE WHITE HOUSE ON 13 JUNE 1995, CONCERNING THE DECISION OF FRANCE TO RESUME NUCLEAR TESTING

Attached is the text of a statement by the Press Secretary of the White House, issued on 13 June 1995, which I referred to in my statement to the CD Plenary meeting of 15 June 1995, concerning the decision of France to resume nuclear testing.

I would be grateful if you would issue this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants in the work of the CD.

(Signed): Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

13 June 1995

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

France announced today that it intends to resume nuclear testing. The United States regrets this action. We continue to urge all of the nuclear Powers, including France, to join in a global moratorium as we work to complete a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty at the earliest possible time. In this regard, we take note of President Chirac's strong commitment to end French testing no later than May 1996 and to sign a CTB Treaty no later than the fall of 1996. We will continue to work with France and all other States participating in the CTB negotiations to ensure that a Treaty is ready for signature as early as possible.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1323
19 June 1995

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH/SPANISH

LETTER DATED 16 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CHILE ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILE ON THE RESUMPTION OF FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTS

Attached is the text of the official statement made by the Government of Chile on the resumption of French nuclear tests, which I request you to circulate as an official CD document.

(Signed) JORGE BERGUÑO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Chile
to the Conference on Disarmament

Annex

STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILE

(Original: Spanish)

The Government of Chile expresses its rejection of the decision by France, announced yesterday by President Jacques Chirac, to resume nuclear tests for a limited period in the Muroroa atoll (South Pacific). This action is a serious threat to the conduct of the negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, an aspiration which is of the highest priority for our country, and a serious challenge to disarmament initiatives in general.

The Government of Chile, reiterating a constant principle of its foreign policy, appeals urgently to the Government of France to reconsider this decision in the interests of the protection of human life and the environment, as well as respect for the commitment of the international community in the areas of disarmament and world security.

Santiago, 14 June 1995

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1324
19 June 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDONESIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A PRESS RELEASE FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA EXPRESSING THE POSITION OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO RESUME NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

Upon instruction, I have the honour to submit to you a press release from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia expressing the position of the Indonesian Government on the decision taken by the French Government to resume nuclear-weapon tests.

It would be highly appreciated, if you could take the necessary steps to include this document as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and at the same time to make it available to all member and non-member States participating in the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Agus Tarmidzi
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

INDONESIA URGES FRANCE TO RECONSIDER DECISION TO RESUME NUCLEAR TESTING

With regard to the recent announcement by the French Government that it would resume nuclear testing in the South Pacific, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia finds such a decision regrettable as it does not conform in any way to the decision adopted during the 1995 Review and Extension Conference on the NPT which, among others, has urged the nuclear-weapon States to exercise utmost restraint.

The Government of the Republic of Indonesia is of the view that all States Parties to the NPT should take all necessary steps to promote a programme of action toward the realization of the universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by 1996. In this respect the Government of the Republic of Indonesia appeals to the French Government to reconsider its decision to resume nuclear testing.

Jakarta, 14 June 1995

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1325
20 June 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRALIA TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM, THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER, THE HONOURABLE P.J. KEATING MP, ISSUED ON 15 JUNE 1995, CONCERNING THE RESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR TESTING BY FRANCE

Attached is the text of a statement by the current Chairman of the South Pacific Forum, the Australian Prime Minister, the Hon. P.J. Keating MP, issued on 15 June 1995, concerning the resumption of nuclear testing by France. The South Pacific Forum comprises the following Member States: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa.

I would be grateful if you would issue this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants in the work of the CD.

(Signed): Richard Starr
Ambassador and
Permanent Representative for Disarmament Affairs

TEXT OF STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM, THE PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA, THE HONOURABLE P.J. KEATING MP

On behalf of South Pacific Forum Heads of Government as current Chair of the Forum, I condemn France's decision to resume nuclear testing in the South Pacific.

Individual Forum Governments have already issued statements and protests that reflect the depth of their disappointment. The immediate widespread public antagonism to France's decision right across the South Pacific reflects the resentment felt by our peoples.

Forum Heads of Government understand and share these feelings. On their behalf, I express our unequivocal opposition to France's decision.

The statements that have been issued by other nuclear powers, and by other countries in Asia and in other parts of the world are welcome. Forum leaders hope that France will hear and take note of what the world is saying.

France has exercised a choice about the nature of its engagement in the South Pacific. Forum members had welcomed the improved relations between France and countries in the region. France's decision is a major setback to this trend which was partly founded on its 1992 Moratorium on Nuclear Testing in the South Pacific.

The wider implications of France's decision are also of deep concern to Forum Heads of Government.

France's decision undermines the outcome of the recent Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC). The decision is particularly regrettable in the light of agreement reached at that Conference, including by France, that negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) should be completed by no later than 1996 and that, pending such a treaty, nuclear weapon States would exercise the utmost restraint.

The South Pacific Forum remains strongly committed to a CTBT as a key step in global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. It offers the prospect of ending testing completely - in the South Pacific as elsewhere. The Heads of Government have noted President Chirac's commitment that France would sign such a treaty. They will hold France to that commitment.

Heads of Government also call on France to abide by the Protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.

I am in contact with my fellow Heads of Government about arrangements for a Forum delegation to convey to the French Government the depth of the Forum's concern. I envisage that the delegation would be led by the Australian Foreign Minister, Senator Evans.

Canberra
15 June 1995

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1326
21 June 1995

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 20 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF PERU ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF AN OFFICIAL COMMUNICATION CONCERNING THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO RESUME NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

The Permanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations Office and other international bodies based in Geneva presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to request the circulation as an official document of the text annexed to this note.

The Permanent Mission would be grateful if the text could be translated into the official languages of the United Nations before circulation.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Official communiqué No. 14/95

The Peruvian Government today received an official communication from the Government of France notifying it of the forthcoming resumption of nuclear tests in the South Pacific.

The Peruvian Government protests vigorously against this decision by the Government of France, which is a serious setback to the international community's consistent efforts to bring about a complete halt to nuclear testing and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by means of appropriate international agreements.

Considering, furthermore, that the resumption of these nuclear tests will cause irreparable damage to the environment, Peru urges the French Government to reconsider, in keeping with its policy of favouring international peace, disarmament and environmental protection.

The Peruvian Government also wishes to announce it is in contact with other Governments, given the serious impact of this decision on the international community.

Lima, 13 June 1995

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Press Office

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1327
23 June 1995

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 22 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXTS OF THE DOCUMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN SUMMIT, ISSUED IN MOSCOW ON 10 MAY 1995, NAMELY: JOINT STATEMENT ON NONPROLIFERATION, JOINT STATEMENT ON THE TRANSPARENCY AND IRREVERSIBILITY OF THE PROCESS OF REDUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, JOINT STATEMENT ON DEMARCATION BETWEEN ABM SYSTEMS AND THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, JOINT STATEMENT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND JOINT STATEMENT ON A NEW INTERNATIONAL EXPORT CONTROL REGIME

We have the honour to forward to you the texts of the documents of the Russian-American Summit, issued in Moscow on 10 May 1995, namely: Joint Statement on Nonproliferation, Joint Statement on the Transparency and Irreversibility of the Process of Reducing Nuclear Weapons, Joint Statement on demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems, Joint Statement on European security, Joint Statement on a new international export control regime.

Could you please take the appropriate steps to issue these documents jointly as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament, and to distribute it to all member delegations and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed): Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the United States of
America to the
Conference on Disarmament

(Signed): Grigori V. Berdennikov
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the Russian Federation
to the
Conference on Disarmament

JOINT STATEMENT ON NONPROLIFERATION

The President of the United States of America, William J. Clinton, and the President of the Russian Federation, B.N. Yeltsin, at their meeting in Moscow, 9-10 May 1995, expressed the strong view that the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference under way in New York should decide to make the Treaty permanent. The two leaders pledged that the United States and Russia will continue to work to ensure the full implementation of the Treaty. In particular, they reaffirmed the commitments by the United States of America and the Russian Federation, under article VI of the NPT, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, which remains their ultimate goal.

The two Presidents also reaffirmed that the United States and the Russian Federation will continue to work together closely to promote broad nonproliferation goals. They agreed that, in the newly-established bilateral working group on nonproliferation, the two sides would consult in a timely manner on issues of mutual concern, including how best to fulfil their responsibility to cooperate with other NPT parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while at the same time fulfilling their responsibility to avoid risks of proliferation. The leaders recognized the importance of a responsible approach to the transfer of nuclear-related material, equipment, and technology and to training. In this connection, they reaffirmed their commitments to the NPT and to the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines, and in particular to the principles that nuclear transfers should take place only under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and only when a supplier is satisfied that such transfers to any non-nuclear weapon State would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The leaders directed the working group on nonproliferation to prepare assessments of proliferation threats in various regions of the world, to consider practical means of addressing those threats, to assess evidence regarding possible non-compliance with nonproliferation commitments, and to report to them periodically on its progress.

The two Presidents strongly supported the concrete progress recently made in their two countries' cooperation in ensuring the security of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials that can be used in such weapons. They reiterated their call for broad and expanded cooperation on a bilateral and multilateral basis, consistent with their international obligations, to strengthen national and international regimes of control, accounting, and physical protection of nuclear materials, and to prevent illegal traffic in nuclear materials. They directed all relevant agencies and organizations in their respective countries to facilitate in a coordinated manner, effective cooperation to this end.

They directed that the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission prepare a joint report on steps that have been accomplished and additional steps that should be taken to ensure the security of nuclear materials.

The leaders reaffirmed their strong support for the IAEA and reiterated their view that its safeguards programme plays a fundamental role in the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. They stressed the importance of enhancing the IAEA's ability to detect diversions of nuclear material and to provide increased assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities, in particular through the effort currently under way to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system.

The Presidents agreed that the formal participation of the Russian Federation in the multilateral nonproliferation export control regimes would significantly strengthen those regimes as well as broaden the basis for cooperation between the two countries on nonproliferation. They agreed to direct officials in their respective Governments to address expeditiously the issues affecting Russian membership in the various regimes, with a view to ensuring active United States support for Russian admission to each of the regimes at the earliest possible date.

Moscow, 10 May 1995

JOINT STATEMENT ON THE TRANSPARENCY AND IRREVERSIBILITY OF THE PROCESS OF REDUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation,

After examining the exchange of views which took place during the December 1994 meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission in regard to the aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, stocks of fissile materials, and their safety and security, as well as a discussion of the Joint Working Group on Nuclear Safeguards, Transparency and Irreversibility of further measures to improve confidence in and increase the transparency and irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons,

Reaffirm the commitment of the United States of America and the Russian Federation to the goal of nuclear disarmament and their desire to pursue further measures to improve confidence in and increase the transparency and irreversibility of the process of nuclear arms reduction, as they agreed in January and September 1994,

Reaffirm the desire of the United States of America and the Russian Federation to exchange detailed information on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of fissile materials and on their safety and security and to develop a process for exchange of this information on a regular basis; and

Express the desire of the United States of America and the Russian Federation to establish as soon as possible concrete arrangements for enhancing transparency and irreversibility of the process of nuclear arms reduction.

Taking into account the proposal by President B.N. Yeltsin for a treaty on nuclear safety and strategic stability among the five nuclear Powers, they declare that:

- **Fissile materials removed from nuclear weapons being eliminated and excess to national security requirement will not be used to manufacture nuclear weapons;**
- **No newly produced fissile materials will be used in nuclear weapons; and**
- **Fissile materials from or within civil nuclear programs will not be used to manufacture nuclear weapons.**

The United States of America and the Russian Federation will negotiate agreements to increase the transparency and irreversibility of nuclear arms reduction that, inter alia, establish:

- **An exchange on a regular basis of detailed information on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of fissile materials and on their safety and security;**

- A cooperative arrangement for reciprocal monitoring at storage facilities of fissile materials removed from nuclear warheads and declared to be excess to national security requirements to help confirm the irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons, recognizing that progress in this area is linked to progress in implementing the joint United States-Russian program for the fissile material storage facility at Mayak; and

- Other cooperative measures, as necessary to enhance confidence in the reciprocal declarations on fissile material stockpiles.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation will strive to conclude as soon as possible agreements which are based on these principles.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation will also examine and seek to define further measures to increase the transparency and irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons, including intergovernmental arrangements to extend cooperation to further phases of the process of eliminating nuclear weapons declared excess to national security requirements as a result of nuclear arms reduction.

The Presidents urged progress in implementing current agreements affecting the irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons such as the 23 June 1994 agreement concerning the shutdown of plutonium production reactors and the cessation of use of newly produced plutonium for nuclear weapons, in all its interrelated provisions, including, inter alia, cooperation in creation of alternative energy sources, shutdown of plutonium production reactors mentioned above, and development of respective compliance procedures.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation will seek to conclude in the shortest possible time an agreement for cooperation between their Governments enabling the exchange of information as necessary to implement the arrangements called for above, by providing for the protection of that information. No information will be exchanged until the respective arrangements enter into force.

Moscow, 10 May 1995

JOINT STATEMENT

The President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation, taking into account the threat posed by worldwide proliferation of missiles and missile technology and the necessity of counteracting this threat, agreed on the following basic principles to serve as a basis for further discussions in order to reach agreement in the field of demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems.

The United States and Russia are each committed to the ABM Treaty, a cornerstone of strategic stability.

Both sides must have the option to establish and to deploy effective theater missile defense systems. Such activity must not lead to violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty.

Theater missile defense systems may be deployed by each side which (1) will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side and (2) will not be tested to give such systems that capability.

Theater missile defense systems will not be deployed by the sides for use against each other.

The scale of deployment - in number and geographic scope - of theater missile defense systems by either side will be consistent with theater ballistic missile programs confronting that side.

In the spirit of partnership, the Presidents undertook to promote reciprocal openness in activities of the sides in theater missile defense systems and in the exchange of corresponding information.

The Presidents confirmed the interest of the sides in the development and fielding of effective theater missile defense systems on a cooperative basis. The sides will make every effort toward the goal of broadening bilateral cooperation in the area of defense against ballistic missiles. They will consider expanding cooperative efforts in theater missile defense technology and exercises, study ways of sharing data obtained through early warning systems, discuss theater missile defense architecture concepts, and seek opportunities for joint research and development in theater missile defense.

The Presidents undertook to continue a broad exchange of views and consultations on the question of theater missile defense at various levels.

Moscow, 10 May 1995

JOINT STATEMENT

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin conducted a thorough review of progress toward their shared goal of a stable, secure, integrated and undivided democratic Europe. They agreed that the end of military confrontation, ideological conflict, and division of the Euro-Atlantic region into opposing blocs has created an historic opportunity for all of its peoples. They emphasized their determination to cooperate closely to ensure that in the future, all peoples of the Euro-Atlantic region shall enjoy the benefits of a stable, just and peaceful order.

The Presidents note that the task of strengthening Euro-Atlantic security now requires dealing with challenges very different from those of the Cold War era. Aggressive nationalism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, unresolved territorial disputes, and violations in the area of human rights present serious threats to stability, peace and prosperity. The Presidents agreed that the effort to deal with these challenges must be based on respect for the principles and commitments of the OSCE, particularly concerning democracy, political pluralism, respect for human rights and civil liberties, free market economies and strict respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and self-determination.

The Presidents reviewed prospects for Euro-Atlantic structures in response to the opportunities and challenges posed by the new era. They agreed that the central element of a lasting peace must be the integration of all of Europe into a series of mutually supporting institutions and relationships which ensure that there will be no return to division or confrontation. The evolution of European structures should be directed toward the overall goal of integration. President Clinton stressed that the process should be transparent, inclusive and based on an integral relationship between the security of Europe and that of North America.

The Presidents note the historic task of working closely together toward fuller participation of democratic Russia and the United States of America in the range of worldwide political, economic, and security institutions of the 21st century. It was in this spirit that the two Presidents reviewed steps in the evolution of the Euro-Atlantic security system through the further development of relevant organizations and bilateral and regional cooperation. This includes the decision of Russia to proceed with its individual Partnership Program for the Partnership for Peace and with the document on a broad, enhanced Russia-NATO dialogue and cooperation.

President Clinton supported Russia's efforts to develop further its partnership and cooperation with the EU. He stressed United States' support for Russia's participation in the WTO, GATT and other institutions important to European and global economic and security architecture, as appropriate.

The Presidents agree that the OSCE's commitments in the areas of human rights economics, and security provide a foundation for their effort to build a stable and integrated Europe. In this regard, special attention should be devoted to strengthening the peacekeeping capabilities of the OSCE and to its potential in the sphere of preventive diplomacy and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The Presidents recalled the decision of the December 1994 OSCE Summit in Budapest to develop a model for ensuring comprehensive security for Europe in the 21st century. The United States and Russia believe that such a model should aim to build an undivided Europe, a common space of security and stability and a system that ensures the widest cooperation and coordination among all countries of the Euro-Atlantic region. In this system, all States will have, as stated in Budapest, the inherent right of all States freely to choose or change their security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve.

Moscow, 10 May 1995

JOINT STATEMENT

The President of the Russian Federation welcomes the reaffirmation of the commitment of the United States to support the Russian Federation's participation as a founding member in the multilateral negotiations on elaborating a new international export control regime for the control of arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies.

The President of the United States welcomes the Russian Federation's reaffirmation of its commitment made during the September 1994 Summit to undertake no new contracts or other agreements to transfer arms to Iran. This commitment is comprehensive and covers both arms and associated items.

The Presidents asked Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to record the details in an agreement no later than their meeting in June.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1328
27 June 1995

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 26 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF ECUADOR ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A DECLARATION BY THE RIO GROUP ISSUED ON 22 JUNE 1995 CONCERNING THE DECISION OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO RESUME NUCLEAR-WEAPON TESTS

The Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the European Office of the United Nations and other International Organizations at Geneva presents its compliments to Ambassador Antonio de Icaza, President of the Conference on Disarmament, and, in its capacity as coordinator of the Troika of the Rio Group, has the honour to transmit herewith the text of the Declaration made by the Group on 22 June 1995 concerning the decision of the French Government to resume nuclear tests.

The Permanent Mission requests the President of the Conference on Disarmament to arrange for the secretariat to distribute the Declaration to the delegations of member and observer States in the working languages of the Conference.

DECLARATION BY THE RIO GROUP CONCERNING THE DECISION OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO RESUME NUCLEAR TESTS

Quito, 22 June 1995

Further to the decision of the French Government to resume nuclear tests on Mururoa Atoll, the countries of the Rio Group express their deep concern at that decision and appeal to the Government to reconsider it and to cancel the said tests.

The decision was taken shortly after the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in connection with the negotiation whereof an appeal was made to the Conference on Disarmament to complete the negotiations on an international treaty totally and completely banning nuclear tests.

The countries of the Rio Group reiterate their concern at the potential adverse effects of nuclear tests on the environment and human health, assets that we are obliged to preserve.

The Rio Group, as the Mechanism for Consultation and Concerted Political Action in Latin America and the Caribbean, the first nuclear-weapon-free zone, appeals to all nuclear-weapon States to suspend all nuclear testing through the medium of unilateral or agreed moratoriums pending the entry into force of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1329
CD/NTB/WP.248
30 June 1995

Original: ENGLISH

Statement of the Group of 21 on a Nuclear Test Ban

The Group of 21 is extremely disappointed and fully shares the concern expressed by the international community at the decision recently taken by a nuclear-weapon State to suspend its moratorium and resume nuclear-weapon testing soon, as well as at the nuclear test recently conducted by another nuclear-weapon State. The States Parties of the NPT of G-21 are deeply concerned that such developments run counter to the decisions adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, in particular, the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" and jeopardizes the credibility of the NPT regime. This is a serious setback to the ongoing negotiations for a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and undermines its successful conclusion. The Group of 21 urges that a moratorium on nuclear testing should be observed by all nuclear-weapon States during the CTBT negotiations and until the entry into force of the CTBT.

Conducting or intending to conduct nuclear-weapon tests over and above the substantial number of tests already conducted, raises serious questions about the nuclear-weapon States real intentions with regard to continued development of nuclear weapons. Recent reports about discussions among the nuclear-weapon States on a threshold for a test ban have also given rise to deep concern. The Group holds that consistent with the terms of the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Nuclear-Test Ban, the CTBT should be an instrument against both horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation and should effectively contribute to nuclear disarmament. To admit low yield nuclear testing or to permit testing below a certain threshold by using any technique would defeat such purposes. The Group of 21 reiterates that the CTBT should entail obligations for complete cessation of nuclear tests by all States in all environments and for all time. No tests should be allowed for any reason or justification including the so-called safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons and perfecting the techniques to further develop nuclear weapons. The ban should be comprehensive. The nuclear test-ban issue is a global issue and all its aspects should be multilaterally negotiated in the CD. In this context, the Group of 21 calls upon the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Nuclear Test Ban to take appropriate measures to ensure that negotiations are held for a clear understanding on the scope of the future CTBT.

The Group of 21 has already expressed its concern in its earlier working papers on the possible use of National Technical Means (NTMs) for verification purposes. The Group stresses that the NTMs should not be used on a case-by-case and selective basis. The Group also reiterates that the

Organization should have the capacity and the responsibility of analysing all data. The judgement by the Organization in this regard should be based on data received from the IMS. Moreover, it should be the exclusive responsibility of the Organization to carry out on-site inspection in areas both within and beyond the jurisdiction or control of States parties. The Group is also not convinced of the logic of any "voluntary" funding for the International Monitoring System (IMS) since the cost of the verification activities of the Organization shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted to take into account differences in membership between the United Nations and the Organization of the CTBT.

In view of the above, the Group of 21 reiterates its earlier call upon members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, for an early conclusion of a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1995.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1330
30 June 1995

ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 29 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT DELEGATION OF FRANCE TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT, TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GERARD ERRERA ON 29 JUNE IN THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON A NUCLEAR TEST BAN

The Permanent Delegation of France to the Conference on Disarmament presents compliments to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to transmit herewith the text of the statement made by the Permanent Representative of France, Mr. Gérard Errera, on 29 June 1995 in connection with the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Permanent Delegation of France would be grateful if the secretariat would arrange to have this statement registered as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to all member and observer delegations to the Conference.

My delegation wishes to inform the Committee of the following three decisions:

(1) Firstly, regarding withdrawal clauses, some months ago we made a proposal whereby one of the events which might jeopardize supreme interests would be a fundamental change in the international circumstances which were the basis for the conclusion of a CTB.

The idea was to have the text of the treaty reflect one of the elements of the French position which we had explained at the start of negotiations, namely, that the permanent ending of tests was linked to an assessment of the international strategic situation, particularly the observance of commitments in the spheres of disarmament and of non-proliferation. I also explained to the Conference on Disarmament on 29 July 1993, and then to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban on 7 February 1994 what we meant by this: "We have particularly in mind the main instruments which determine [---] our assessment of the strategic situation, inter alia the ABM Treaty, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the START process [---] and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons."

The debate which we had on withdrawal clauses at the last session revealed the continued existence of reservations on this proposal. Some delegations considered it superfluous, not to say problematic:

Superfluous in that the concept of supreme interest is sufficiently broad to cover a wide variety of situations;

Problematic in that it could restrict individual States' freedom sovereignly to assess the events jeopardizing their supreme interests.

Under the circumstances and in the interest of furthering the negotiations, France has decided not to press for the insertion of this wording. It considers its objectives - which still apply - to be covered by the general provision in the rolling text which reads "Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty [---] have jeopardized its supreme interests".

Without making it a condition for the withdrawal of its proposal, my delegation naturally urges the other delegations which have suggested additions to the withdrawal clause to support the traditional wording too so that it can be adopted by consensus.

(2) Secondly, it is clear that the nuclear Powers still retain a fundamental responsibility, that of ensuring the safety and reliability of their weapons.

We have stressed this crucial point since the start of negotiations.

I declare, therefore, that the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons represent for France a supreme interest.

(3) Finally, as to the duration of the future treaty, my delegation is in a position to state its formal agreement with the concept of a treaty of unlimited duration. The brackets around the word "unlimited" can therefore be removed.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1331
30 June 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 30 JUNE 1995 FROM THE DEPUTY HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF SRI LANKA TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE HEAD OF DELEGATION AT THE 710th PLENARY MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON 29 JUNE 1995 CONCERNING THE RESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR TESTING BY CERTAIN NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES

I have the honour to refer to the intervention of my Ambassador concerning recent resumption of nuclear testing by certain nuclear weapon States, which was made during the 710th Plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on 29 June 1995

I should be grateful if you would kindly ensure that the attached part of this intervention could be produced as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) W.P.R.B. Wickremasinghe
Minister
Deputy Head of Delegation

Sri Lanka notes with deep concern the continuation of nuclear testing by one nuclear weapon State and the recent decision made by another to resume testing. These developments are all the more regrettable, taking place so soon after the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference during which the nuclear weapon States undertook, inter alia, to exercise "utmost restraint" in nuclear testing.

Sri Lanka, however, is pleased to note the undertakings given by these nuclear weapon States to conclude a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) no later than the end of 1996.

While expressing its concern at these unfortunate events, Sri Lanka urges the members of the Conference on Disarmament, to conduct their negotiations with renewed vigour to ensure the early conclusion of a CTBT by 1996. In this regard, Sri Lanka wishes to reiterate its strong conviction that the treaty should be comprehensive and without any provision for exceptions; universal and internationally and effectively verifiable. The CTBT should ban all nuclear testing, in all environments, for all time.

I would be grateful, if the text of this statement is issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the member States and non-member participants of the Conference on Disarmament.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1332
30 June 1995

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 26 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF MEXICO ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A PRESS RELEASE FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO CONCERNING THE DECISION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE TO RESUME NUCLEAR TESTS

The Permanent Mission of Mexico to the international organizations having their headquarters at Geneva presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to transmit herewith the press release from the Ministry of Foreign Relations of the Government of Mexico concerning the decision by the Government of France to resume nuclear tests.

The Permanent Mission would be grateful if the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament would arrange for this text to be distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

MEXICO'S CONCERN AT THE DECISION BY SOME COUNTRIES TO CARRY OUT NUCLEAR TESTS

Our country reaffirms its decision to continue fighting in the international forums responsible for negotiating the various aspects of disarmament.

Tlatelolco, D.F., 20 June 1995.

* * *

The Government of Mexico has communicated to the Governments of the nuclear Powers its concern at the decision by some of them to resume nuclear tests despite the exhortation by the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that they should exercise utmost restraint in this regard.

It will be recalled that Mexico, supported by a large majority of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, submitted at this recent Conference in New York a concrete proposal not only for the designation of 1996 as the time-limit for the conclusion of negotiations on a convention banning all nuclear tests without exception but also for the adoption of an immediate moratorium on this type of tests.

While Mexico's first proposal was adopted by consensus, the proposal to declare an immediate moratorium on nuclear tests was not accepted, precisely because of the opposition of some nuclear Powers. Instead, as we observe above, a paragraph was included in which the nuclear States are asked to exercise the utmost restraint in this regard.

Mexico feels that the nuclear test carried out by the Republic of China on 15 May last, the announcement by France of a series of nuclear tests to be carried out in the South Pacific and the statement by a senior United States representative to the effect that his country might also resume nuclear testing do not create a propitious climate for the performance of the series of important agreements adopted by consensus at the aforementioned Conference and jeopardize not only future disarmament negotiations but also the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Nuclear testing is the most direct method of improving military arsenals. That being so, it is inconceivable that anyone should wish to continue the arms race now, when the nuclear arsenals already in existence are estimated to be equivalent to one million times the yield of the Hiroshima atomic bomb, energy enough to wipe out the world's population forty times over.

In this context, Mexico reaffirms its decision to continue fighting in the international forums responsible for negotiating the various aspects of disarmament, to ensure that the goals that have been set are achieved and has, to that end, begun consultations with other countries that share its point of view.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1333
30 June 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 29 JUNE 1995 FROM THE ACTING HEAD OF THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER, THE HONOURABLE P.J. KEATING MP CONCERNING THE RESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR TESTING BY FRANCE

Attached is the text of a statement by the Australian Prime Minister, the Hon. P.J. Keating MP, concerning the resumption of nuclear testing by France.

I would be grateful if you would issue this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants in the work of the CD.

(Signed): Patrick Cole
Counsellor
Acting Head of Delegation

French Nuclear Testing

Statement by the Australian Prime Minister, the Hon. P.J. Keating MP

"Cabinet met last night to consider further Australia's response to President Chirac's announcement on 13 June that France would resume nuclear testing in the South Pacific.

Cabinet's deliberations were against the background of the French rejection of the efforts of the South Pacific Forum delegation, led by Senator Evans, to persuade France not to proceed with the tests.

Australia's response to the French decision has been strong, unequivocal and concrete.

The Government has attacked the decision in very strong terms - first in a statement I issued on 14 June immediately following on President Chirac's announcement deploring the decision. I announced in that statement that the Government had frozen cooperation with France in the defence field. The language of that statement was repeated by the Foreign Minister, in Japan at the time, in a series of press conferences, and in a direct telephone conversation with the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Hervé de Charette. The Acting Foreign Minister called in the French Ambassador and issued a formal protest and our Ambassador did likewise in Paris.

The Government has also taken the lead in promoting a strong South Pacific regional action. On 15 June, I issued a statement as Chair of the Forum condemning the French decision, after consultations with my fellow South Pacific Forum Heads of Government. On 19 June Senator Evans led a delegation of Forum representatives which conveyed direct to the French Government the region's condemnation of the decision and the deep resentment it has aroused in the whole region.

The Government gave instructions to its embassies abroad to make our position known on the French decision. Many countries have expressed their opposition to the tests, including a number of our closest neighbours.

Australia has also made active use of multilateral forums to leave no doubt as to where we stand on this issue. We have expressed our outrage at the French decision in the United Nations in New York, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

On 19 June I made a speech in Parliament setting out the Government's views on the decision and Australia's relationship with France.

Concerned about flow-on consequences of the French decision, I have instructed our Ambassador in Washington to welcome the continued United States commitment to its moratorium and urge the United States to maintain its leadership in negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) in terms acceptable not only to the nuclear-weapon States but the wider international community. Our Ambassadors in Beijing, London and Moscow will also be making representations to the other nuclear-weapon States in favour of the moratorium on testing and early conclusion of the CTBT.

By any measure this amounts to an unequivocal response. I am in no doubt that the French are clear about our views.

Last night, Cabinet - after hearing a report and recommendations from Senator Evans - decided upon a series of further measures now to be taken and in the light of the outcome of the Forum delegation's visit to France, covering actions at the bilateral, regional and global level. These measures are in line with the Government's consistent policy on this issue which has been to respond in a measured, graduated way, leaving open every avenue from France to respond to South Pacific concerns.

In broad outline the proposed measures are as follows:

- The Government has decided that Australia's Ambassador in Paris is to be recalled for urgent consultations and briefing on how Australia can best continue to react to the French decision.
- The Government has decided to extend the curtailment of defence contacts with France in the areas of ship and aircraft visits, training, senior officer visits, material acquisition, and defence-related agreements and arrangements. The senior Australian defence force representative in Paris will be recalled. (In relation to the curtailment of aircraft visits, the Department of Defence will take the operational steps required to continue to provide the same level of maritime surveillance to the Pacific Island countries.)
- The Government will convene a special meeting of South Pacific Environment Ministers to discuss the environmental impact of testing.
- The Government will be consulting with Forum countries on possible regional measures including the suspension of France's status as a South Pacific Forum dialogue partner for the duration of testing; a possible boycott by individual Forum countries of the South Pacific games to be held in French Polynesia in August; and the formation of a Forum regional action committee to coordinate responses to France's decision, mobilize and support community campaigns in Forum countries, and report to the Madang Forum in September.
- The Government will be consulting with Forum countries on the desirability of a public information campaign being mobilized in France to sensitize public opinion to the strength of regional opposition to French testing and the reasons for it.
- At a wider international level, Australian delegations and representatives will take advantage of all available opportunities to register Australian and regional opposition to French testing in

the United Nations and all other appropriate multilateral bodies, including where appropriate through the initiation of resolutions.

- A high-level officials mission will be sent to nuclear-weapon States to argue the case for an acceptably drafted and quickly negotiated CTBT.

While it is not proposed to embark upon any trade or other direct economic restrictions, it should be noted that the existing policy of entering into no new contracts for the sale of uranium to France until France enters into a comprehensive test-ban treaty will remain in force.

The Government will keep the implementation and impact of the above measures under close review in the months ahead. We are determined to do everything we possibly and reasonably can to ensure that France understands the nature and extent of Australian and South Pacific opposition to its test resumption decision, and acts accordingly.

Canberra, 23 June 1995"

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1334/Corr.1
17 July 1995

ENGLISH ONLY

NOTE VERBALE DATED 27 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF MEXICO ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE DECLARATION BY THE AGENCY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (OPANAL) CONCERNING FRANCE'S RESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR TESTING IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

Corrigendum

The title of document CD/1334 should read as above.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1334
30 June 1995

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 27 JUNE 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF MEXICO ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE DECLARATION BY THE AGENCY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (OPANAL) CONCERNING FRANCE'S RESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR TESTING IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

The Permanent Mission of Mexico to the International Organizations at Geneva presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to transmit herewith the declaration by the Council of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) concerning France's resumption of nuclear testing in the South Pacific.

The Permanent Mission of Mexico would be grateful if the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament would arrange for this text to be distributed as an official document of the Conference.

DECLARATION BY THE COUNCIL OF THE AGENCY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN CONCERNING FRANCE'S RESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR TESTING IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

On the occasion of its one hundred and fifty-second ordinary session, held on 15 June 1995 at the Agency's headquarters, the Council of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) made the following declaration:

The Council of OPANAL, as an organ of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, which established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone, deeply regrets the decision of the Government of France concerning the resumption of its nuclear testing in the South Pacific.

The Council of OPANAL firmly exhorts the Government of France to reconsider that decision and to refrain from conducting future tests. That decision may even affect the auspicious climate for the negotiations on the comprehensive test-ban treaty being conducted at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and jeopardize the important progress made in the field of nuclear disarmament.

Moreover, the resumption of these nuclear tests may have irreparable consequences for the environment and harmful effects on human health.

Mexico City, 16 June 1995

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1335
7 July 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 JULY 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY IN WASHINGTON ON THE OCCASION OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OPENING FOR SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Attached is a copy of a Statement issued by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in Washington on the occasion of the twenty-seventh anniversary of the Opening for Signature of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

I would be grateful if you would issue this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants in the work of the CD.

(Signed) Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Statement on the Occasion of the 27th Anniversary of the Opening for Signature of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - July 1, 1995

On July 1, 1968, President Lyndon Johnson and representatives from 60 other countries signed the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in the East Room of the White House. Since the treaty was signed and entered into force in 1970, the NPT has achieved truly historic importance.

As of July 1, 1995, over 170 countries have become non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT, thereby making a legally binding commitment not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. In addition, each one of the 179 NPT state parties, including the five nuclear weapon states, has agreed to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament which remains our ultimate goal.

The last 12 months have been extremely productive for achieving our twin objectives of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and reducing their number. Most importantly, in May 1995, the NPT state parties decided, without conditions, that the NPT shall continue in force indefinitely in accordance with article x.2 of the treaty.

Other recent developments have also contributed to reducing the threat of nuclear war.

Since July 1 last year, 15 countries have become parties to the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states, including Algeria, Argentina, Chile, and Ukraine -- all of which have peaceful nuclear facilities. There remain only ten countries in the world that are not bound by the NPT or other comparable agreements. Of these ten, only three countries have not placed all their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

The United States has continued to dismantle nuclear weapons at a rate of between 1000 and 2000 per year. For the first time, the U.S. Has placed nuclear weapons material from its stockpile under IAEA safeguards.

In December 1994, the United States and Russia, together with Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, brought the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) into force. Nine thousand nuclear weapons from U.S. and former Soviet strategic delivery vehicles will have been removed from deployment when the treaty is fully implemented.

In his January 21, 1995 State of the Union address, President Clinton called upon the Senate to approve START II. The Senate responded by beginning START II hearings on January 31. When START II is fully implemented, an additional 5,000 nuclear weapons will have been removed from the deployed arsenals of the United States and Russia.

Also in January, the United States extended its moratorium on nuclear weapon testing until a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) enters into force, on the assumption that a CTBT will be signed by September 30, 1996.

In March, President Clinton announced that the U.S. would withdraw permanently 200 metric tons of nuclear weapons material from its stockpile. The United States will also reduce its stockpile of high enriched uranium from nuclear weapons by converting it to low enriched uranium for use in power reactors. The U.S. has also agreed to purchase 500 metric tons in high enriched uranium, previously used in dismantled Russian nuclear weapons, which has been converted to low enriched uranium for use in power reactors.

Also in March, the Conference on Disarmament agreed to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate a multilateral ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The United States and Russia have agreed to cease production of plutonium for use in nuclear explosive devices. In April, the United Kingdom announced that it no longer produces fissile material for nuclear weapons.

In April, the U.S., UK, Russia, and France harmonized their policies prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are NPT parties except in the unlikely event of an attack by a non-nuclear weapon state allied or associated with a nuclear weapon state against a nuclear weapon state or its allies.

Also in April, the UN Security Council adopted by consensus a resolution setting forth in unprecedented detail the means by which to respond in the event that a non-nuclear weapons state party to the NPT is subject to nuclear aggression or threat of such aggression.

At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the parties to the NPT agreed on an ambitious agenda including, inter alia, the adoption of the following measures and undertakings:

(a) universal adherence to the NPT as an urgent priority;

(b) a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable CTBT no later than 1996; pending entry into force of a CTBT, the nuclear weapon states should exercise the "utmost restraint;"

(c) a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(d) the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally;

(e) the development of nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction should be encouraged as a matter of priority;

(f) full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of supplying nuclear equipment and material; and

(g) increasing the capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities.

The NPT parties also agreed to strengthening and making more substantive the treaty's review process.

The United States fully supports this agenda and looks forward to its substantial implementation by the time of the next NPT Review Conference in the year 2000. In this context, we continue to urge all of the nuclear weapon states to join in a global moratorium on nuclear weapon testing as we work to complete a CTBT at the earliest possible time.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1336
10 July 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 JULY 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ROMANIA ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE DECISION OF THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT TO DECLARE A MORATORIUM ON EXPORTS OF ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES

As I had the pleasure to remark at our meeting of 8 June 1995, the Romanian Government has been examining the possibility of declaring a moratorium on exports of anti-personnel landmines, with the view to fully contributing to the current international efforts aimed at ridding the world of the scourge of these horrible weapons.

I can now inform you that a moratorium has already been approved and entered into force on 1 July 1995. The Romanian unilateral moratorium applies to all categories of anti-personnel landmines and it will last for an initial period of one year.

This decision crowns the Romanian stance on landmines and in particular our co-sponsorship of last year's United Nations General Assembly resolution on the establishment of moratoria in this field. Its significance redoubles since it came into force just days before the International Conference on Mine Clearance started its proceedings.

May I kindly ask that this statement be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1337
13 July 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 JULY 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PHILIPPINES ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, HIS EXCELLENCY FIDEL V. RAMOS, CONCERNING THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE TO RESUME NUCLEAR TESTS IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

I have the honour to furnish you herewith a copy of the statement of the President of the Philippines, H.E. Fidel V. Ramos, concerning the decision of the Government of France to resume nuclear tests in the South Pacific.

I would appreciate it if the President's statement could be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): LILIA R. BAUTISTA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

STATEMENT OF H.E. PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS ON THE FRENCH DECISION TO RESUME NUCLEAR TESTING IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

Manila, 21 June 1995

I wish to inform you that I have written personally to His Excellency Jacques Chirac, the President of the Republic of France, conveying to him the deep concern of the Philippine Government over the decision of his government to resume nuclear testing in the South Pacific.

I conveyed to the French President the Philippine view that a resumption of nuclear testing is inimical to the promotion of the kind of international climate we need in order to promote further nuclear arms control and disarmament. I reiterated the support of the Philippines for the eventual conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty.

Our Department of Foreign Affairs also conveyed a diplomatic note to the French Embassy, and to the French Government through the Philippine Embassy in Paris, on the same subject. The note protested the French decision on the resumption of testing.

We sincerely hope that the government and people of France will reflect carefully on the concern and sentiments that have been so clearly expressed by the members of the international community, and most especially by our friends in the South Pacific who will be most directly affected by any hazardous consequences of nuclear testing.

At this point let me stress that the Philippines and France have traditionally enjoyed good relations in many fields. We will continue developing this relationship, which has proven to be mutually beneficial, and which has the potential for even greater growth and diversification in the years ahead. It was precisely the intention of my visit to France last year to deepen and broaden our bilateral ties, considering that we have a great deal of interest in both countries to bring Europe and Asia closer together through our mutual interaction.

At the same time, we are dismayed at this decision of the French Government, which has tremendous implications upon both international and regional security and stability. As a friend of France in the Asia-Pacific, the Philippines calls on the French government to recognize its responsibilities in a global context by seriously and immediately reconsidering its decision.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1338
10 August 1995

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 9 AUGUST 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF UKRAINE ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE CONCERNING FRANCE'S DECISION TO RESUME NUCLEAR TESTING

I have the honour to forward to you the text of a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine concerning the decision made by France to resume nuclear tests, dated 13 July 1995.

Please take the appropriate steps to register this document as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament, and to have it distributed to all member States' and non-member States' delegations taking part in the work of the Conference.

(Signed) Olexander Slipchenko
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Ukraine
Head of delegation

STATEMENT

by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine concerning France's decision to resume nuclear testing

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine wishes to express its profound concern at the decision taken by France to resume nuclear testing in the south Pacific.

This step, taken by France soon after the completion of the work of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which adopted the historic decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely, conflicts with the provisions of the document adopted by the Conference on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" and will not promote the development of the positive trends which have recently been observed in the field of nuclear disarmament.

The ending of the moratorium and the resumption of testing run counter to the agreement of the nuclear States to exercise "utmost restraint" pending the entry into force of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT), as well as the reaffirmation of the conviction that "the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones ... enhances global and regional peace and security".

The resumption of nuclear testing by France may call into question the prospect of the successful completion no later than 1996 of the negotiations on a CTBT being carried out in the Conference on Disarmament, which in turn will slow down the implementation of other measures in the sphere of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Ukraine, which has demonstrated by means of practical actions the consistency of its foreign policy in strengthening the global regime for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, calls on France to take all necessary steps to ensure the speediest possible conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT), to review its decision to resume nuclear testing and to join other nuclear States in complying with the moratorium on the conduct of such tests.

13 July 1995

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1339
10 August 1995

Original: ENGLISH

STATEMENT OF THE GROUP OF 21 ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION CIRCULATED BY ARGENTINA IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (S/1995/567)

1. The G-21 takes note of the draft resolution circulated to members of the Security Council regarding the proposed role for the Security Council on the question of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

2. The G-21 notes with concern that the draft resolution is silent on the vertical proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, on nuclear disarmament and on the continued existence and retention of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear-weapon States. In the Group's view, the huge nuclear weapons stockpiles in the possession of the nuclear-weapon States, continuing qualitative improvements to nuclear weapons systems and the development and production of new nuclear weapons must constitute a priority in the field of multilateral disarmament since these represent a grave danger to international peace and security. It is this issue which should be of special concern to the Security Council, in view of the overwhelming demand for the elimination of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, recognized and voiced in various United Nations General Assembly resolutions.

3. The Group believes that non-proliferation, in all its aspects, can be best promoted through the adoption and implementation of a legally binding, multilaterally negotiated Treaty for elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. It is high time that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) commenced negotiations on such a Treaty. This would be consistent with the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions which aim to eliminate respective categories of weapons of mass destruction entirely.

4. Any deviation from the role envisaged for the Security Council under the United Nations Charter or in certain circumstances under multilateral treaties on non-proliferation and disarmament would undermine the provisions of these treaties and conventions, including the inherent mechanisms for securing redress for the violations of their provisions. It would also call into question the value of painstaking multilateral negotiations on disarmament and arms control treaties in the CD.

5. In this context, the Group reiterates its position that the CD is the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament issues. Circumventing the CD or undermining the provisions of the existing treaties will seriously prejudice the ongoing negotiations in the CD on the CTBT and other issues.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1340
17 August 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 AUGUST 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES MADE ON 11 AUGUST 1995 CONCERNING UNITED STATES NUCLEAR TESTING POLICY AND A WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET ISSUED ALSO ON 11 AUGUST 1995 CONCERNING UNITED STATES CTBT SAFEGUARDS

Attached is a copy of a Statement by the President of the United States, made on 11 August 1995, concerning United States nuclear testing policy, and a White House Fact Sheet, issued also on 11 August, concerning United States CTBT Safeguards.

I would be grateful if you would issue these texts as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants in the work of the CD.

(Signed) Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Statement by President Clinton, 11 August 1995, The White House

Today I am announcing my decision to negotiate a true zero yield comprehensive test ban. This is an historic milestone in our efforts to reduce the nuclear threat to build a safe world. The United States will now insist on a test ban that prohibits any nuclear weapons test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion. I am convinced this decision will speed the negotiations so that we can achieve our goal of signing a comprehensive test ban next year.

As a central part of this decision, I am establishing concrete, specific safeguards that define the conditions under which the United States will enter into a comprehensive test ban. These safeguards will strengthen our commitments in the areas of intelligence, monitoring and verification, stockpile stewardship, maintenance of our nuclear laboratories, and test readiness.

They also specify the circumstances under which I would be prepared, in consultation with Congress, to exercise our supreme national interest rights under a comprehensive test ban to conduct necessary testing if the safety or reliability of our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified.

As a part of this arrangement I am today directing the establishment of a new annual reporting and certification requirement that will ensure that our nuclear weapons remain safe and reliable under a comprehensive test ban.

I appreciate the time, the energy and the wisdom that the Secretaries of State, Defense and Energy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Directors of Central Intelligence and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency have all devoted to the review of this crucial national security issue over the last several months.

American leaders since Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy have believed a comprehensive test ban would be a major stride toward stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Now, as then, such a treaty would greatly strengthen the security of the United States and nations throughout the world. But now, unlike then, such a treaty is within our reach.

It would build upon the successes we have achieved so far: securing a permanent extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty; freezing North Korea's nuclear program; cutting existing nuclear arsenals by putting the START I Treaty into force; persuading Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to give up their nuclear weapons and to reach agreements with Russia that now mean that both our nations no longer target our missiles at each other.

A comprehensive test ban is the right step as we continue pulling back from the nuclear precipice, a precipice which we began to live with 50 years ago this week. It moves us one step closer to the day when no nuclear weapons are detonated anywhere on the face of the Earth.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

11 August 1995

Fact sheet: Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Safeguards

A Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is conditioned on:

A. The conduct of a Science-based Stockpile Stewardship program to ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the active stockpile, including the conduct of a broad range of effective and continuing experimental programs.

B. The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology which will attract, retain, and ensure the continued application of our human scientific resources to those programs on which continued progress in nuclear technology depends.

C. The maintenance of the basic capability to resume nuclear test activities prohibited by the CTBT should the United States cease to be bound to adhere to this treaty.

D. Continuation of a comprehensive research and development program to improve our treaty-monitoring capabilities and operations.

E. The continuing development of a broad range of intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities and operations to ensure accurate and comprehensive information on worldwide nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapons development programs, and related nuclear programs.

F. The understanding that if the President of the United States is informed by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy (DOE) - advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories and the Commander of the United States Strategic Command - that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear-weapon type which the two Secretaries consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, the President, in consultation with Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT under the standard "supreme national interests" clause in order to conduct whatever testing might be required.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1341
22 August 1995

Original: ENGLISH

PROGRESS REPORT TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ON THE FORTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE AD HOC GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS TO CONSIDER INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE MEASURES TO DETECT AND IDENTIFY SEISMIC EVENTS

1. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, initially established in pursuance of the decision taken by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 22 July 1976, held its forty-first formal session from 7 to 18 August 1995, in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Dr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden. This was the thirty-third session of the Group, convened under its new mandate by the decision of the Committee on Disarmament at its 48th meeting on 7 August 1979.

2. The Ad Hoc Group is open to all Member States of the Conference on Disarmament. It is also open on a standing basis to all non-Member States which have been invited upon their request by the Conference on Disarmament to participate in its work. Accordingly, scientific experts and representatives of the following Member States of the Conference on Disarmament participated in the session: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Romania, the Russian Federation, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

3. Scientific experts and representatives from the following non-Member States of the Conference on Disarmament participated in the session: Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Israel, the Republic of Korea, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland and Ukraine.

4. During the session 63 papers containing information on national investigations related to the work of the Group were presented by participating experts. These working papers not only described the individual operational aspects of the participation in GSETT-3 but also contained important information related to the evaluation of the experiment. In addition, substantial technical and scientific material was presented by the three GSETT-3 Working Groups on Planning, Operations and Evaluation.

5. The Group reviewed results from its Third Technical Test, GSETT-3, which successfully began full-scale operations on 1 January 1995. As stated in CD/1254, the primary objectives of GSETT-3 are to:

- Develop and test new concepts for an experimental International Seismic Monitoring System (ISMS), building upon previous experience;

- Provide a practical basis upon which to furnish the Conference on Disarmament with timely technical information;

- Develop an experimental system that can evolve and adapt to support future requirements that may be specified for an International Seismic Monitoring System.

The concepts for an experimental seismic monitoring system to be tested during GSETT-3 include: a single centralized International Data Centre (IDC), a specifically designed high-quality seismographic network consisting of about 50 primary (Alpha) stations and 100-150 auxiliary (Beta) stations, National Data Centres (NDCs) in participating countries, and a modern communications system to support data exchange among these elements.

The IDC has been in operation since 1 January 1995, with the processing and analysis methods at the IDC being continuously improved as experience is gained. As of this date, 37 primary and 75 auxiliary stations are participating in the experiment. This participation is detailed in the tables and figures attached to this Report.

The global station coverage is presently uneven, and many of the conclusions drawn are based on observational data from selected regions only. These are regions with station coverage corresponding to the original GSETT-3 plan, and the observational results are supplemented by theoretical modelling and are continuously evaluated. Although the number of stations currently participating falls short of that envisaged when the experiment was planned, there is wide enough participation to begin to draw practical conclusions regarding several aspects of the ISMS concept. Some of the most important conclusions are summarized below, with additional details provided in Annex 1.

6. The GSETT-3 has demonstrated the following technical results:

(a) The overall concept of a system based on a single IDC, NDCs in participating States and a two-tiered network of primary and auxiliary stations is an efficient concept for an International Seismological Monitoring System.

(b) A single International Data Centre, of the structure and size established during GSETT-3, can acquire and archive the volume of seismic data that is anticipated from the IMS to be established under a CTBT. It has been shown that a single IDC can routinely analyze this large volume of data in a timely manner and produce and distribute a set of defined products that are usable and useful for seismological monitoring and system evaluation. Additional work is needed, however, to further develop methods to provide characterization parameters and for providing user-friendly reporting products.

(c) The joint processing at the IDC of continuous data from a select, high-quality network of primary seismic stations is an effective means of detecting seismic events and achieving a preliminary location.

(d) Full redundancy of key equipment at the IDC is essential for reliable operations and to avoid loss of data. Key elements of the ISMS must be improved in terms of robustness and, often, redundancy in order to provide the 99% or higher reliability specified in CD/1254.

(e) NDCs play a critical role in the operation and maintenance of reliable stations and communication links, and form an effective interface between the IDC and participating States through which data and products can be accessed and evaluated.

(f) Regional communication nodes have proved useful during GSETT-3 and could, if equipped with sufficient redundancy, provide a back-up data storage capability if the IDC failed catastrophically. NDCs also have a useful back-up function.

(g) Seismic arrays at low noise sites will be the most valuable type of installation in the primary network of the seismic component of any proposed IMS. The GSETT-3 has shown the value of upgrading stations from three components to arrays. Digital data from stations with high operational capability and reliability are essential.

(h) The capability of the IDC to routinely and automatically retrieve supplementary data on request from a global network of auxiliary stations has been demonstrated.

(i) Limited experiments have been conducted to demonstrate mechanisms for system integrity, including data authentication. Further development and testing of authentication procedures and data and system security are, however, needed.

(j) The GSETT-3 has proven to be a valuable impetus to countries participating in the experiment for the installation of high-quality seismic equipment and communications equipment.

(k) The experiment has shown the necessity for stations to meet defined minimum technical specifications. The minimum recommended station requirements provided in CD/1254 is confirmed by the experience of GSETT-3 thus far.

(l) There has been a considerable and lengthy effort to establish the infrastructure needed for GSETT-3, including the stations, NDCs, the IDC and the communications links. The Ad Hoc Group considers it essential that the operation of key elements of this infrastructure that could contribute to the future IMS established under a CTBT be maintained.

7. The scientific results and capabilities demonstrated in GSETT-3 are not uniform in a geographical sense. Nevertheless, results to date allow the following preliminary points to be made:

(a) Considerable operational experience is necessary to achieve the potential capability of a seismic monitoring network. The capability of the GSETT-3 network has steadily improved since the beginning of the experiment. These improvements have been brought about by improvements in operational procedures at all levels, by improved data processing methods and by the addition of stations in the network.

(b) In regions of the world for which the planned primary network is nearly complete (i.e., North America, northern Europe, Australia), the network detects events with a magnitude of 3.5-4.0 with high probability. This supports the previous theoretical estimates of the global detection capability of a 50-60 station primary network and gives confidence that these theoretical estimates are correct on a global basis. However, the current capability is significantly less in other regions of the world, and must be improved.

(c) The combination of the primary network and an auxiliary network should be able to achieve a location accuracy of within 1,000 square kilometres. In regions of the world for which the planned network is nearly complete (i.e., North America, northern Europe, Australia), the location error of the primary network is estimated to be between 20-50 km for seismic events of magnitude 4. The use of auxiliary stations can reduce this to 15-25 km, based on GSETT-3 experience in the same areas. Previous work has demonstrated that calibration of the network can further improve location estimates, and this remains to be demonstrated in selected regions during GSETT-3.

(d) Participating countries have made available to the IDC supplementary information on seismic events based on analysing data from their own national networks, which are maintained to individual national standards. These supplementary data have proven useful in evaluating the performance of the GSETT-3 network and should be useful in improving the capability of the network by calibration.

(e) The experiment has shown that the current seismological network is inadequate for monitoring the southern oceanic areas. Data from a hydroacoustic network in these regions used in conjunction with the seismic network might be essential for monitoring seismic events of magnitude below 4 in these areas. More work is needed on this topic.

8. Costs

(a) GSETT-3 has reconfirmed the estimate made in CD/1254 that the investment costs for the GSETT-3 stations, communications links and IDC are approximately 180 million US$. This number comprises 150 million US$ invested prior to GSETT-3 and 30 million US$ in new investments.

(b) **GSETT-3 has also reconfirmed the estimate made in CD/1254 that the yearly operations and maintenance costs for the GSETT-3 stations, communications links and IDC are approximately 30 million US$.**

9. Documentation, Training and Participation

(a) A complete set of comprehensive Operational Manuals have been compiled for seismic stations, NDCs and the IDC. These Operational Manuals have proven essential to support the GSETT-3 system operations, data exchange and processing. These manuals should prove useful models for the Operations Manuals for the future ISMS.

(b) The GSETT-3 has demonstrated the importance of practical training of international staff at the IDC and of national staff at NDCs. This training, which is already taking place, should be continued and expanded.

(c) The GSETT-3 has also demonstrated that an international technical staff can work effectively together at the IDC. In fact, this international participation in the IDC work has been crucial to the success of GSETT-3.

10. Future plans

The Ad Hoc Group also discussed its future plans. The Group agreed upon a work program which is presented below. This work program gives an overview of and schedule for the remaining tasks envisaged for the completion and evaluation of the GSETT-3 monitoring system.

(a) Development of the GSETT-3 System

The Ad Hoc Group will provide continuing improvements to the operational procedures and methods for the system. For example, the following specific efforts are underway:

- Network Development: There will be a continuation of the step-by-step implementation of additional seismic facilities around the world. Efforts will be made to make the primary network of the GSETT-3 fully operational as envisaged by GSE and mentioned in Tables 1 and 2 in Annex 2. Efforts will also be made to supplement all the auxiliary stations offered by various countries and mentioned in the tables in Annex 2. Plans are underway to hold regional workshops in Africa and South America to increase participation of auxiliary stations.

- Communications: Work will continue to establish modern communications for reliable data transmission from stations in remote regions of China, Egypt, Pakistan and Russia. Efforts are also underway to explore new methods for reliable and cost-effective communications that offer redundant transmission paths between stations and data centres.

- International Data Centre: The IDC will incorporate new software to support a demonstration of calibration of the network and processing systems in selected regions. It will continue to issue a daily, high-quality bulletin of events and provide subscription services for all participants. The IDC products will be expanded to include additional event characterization parameters and to provide user-friendly reporting products that are useful to support both technical evaluation and national verification needs.

(b) Evaluation and Completion of GSETT-3

The Ad Hoc Group will complete a comprehensive evaluation of the first year of the GSETT-3 experiment with emphasis on specific technical issues that are needed to define the IMS. Based on this evaluation, the Group will develop a schedule and plan for the completion of GSETT-3.

(c) Transition of the GSETT-3 System and Experience

The Ad Hoc Group will examine the issues to be addressed in a transition from GSETT-3 to IMS operations. The Ad Hoc Group will develop a plan to address these issues, and thus would be prepared for a possible request by the CD. The Group will also continue to expand training programs in data processing and seismic data analysis at both the IDC and through national initiatives, and complete documentation of the operational aspects of GSETT-3 will be updated and expanded as a model for developing procedures for the IMS.

The above tasks will be completed in accordance with the following schedule:

August 1995- February 1996	Continue development of the GSETT-3 system, as described in section (a), with emphasis on improving network coverage, communications and IDC products and services.
November 1995	Complete the first draft of an evaluation report on the GSETT-3. Develop plan for completing GSETT-3.
	Develop initial list of auxiliary stations recommended for the seismic component of the IMS network.
	Develop initial draft plan for the transition of the GSETT-3 network to the IMS network.
	Meet in Geneva to discuss draft report, auxiliary station recommendations and GSETT-3 to IMS transition plan.
November 1995- February 1996	Complete the evaluation of the first year of GSETT-3. Develop and implement network calibration procedures.
February 1996	Meet in Geneva to complete a comprehensive report providing an evaluation of GSETT-3, based on the first year of operations.

Adopt plan for completion and transition of the GSETT-3 system to IMS.

Complete report on recommendation for auxiliary stations.

11. It was noted that facilities are incomplete for some of the stations envisioned as part of the GSETT-3 monitoring network (CD/1254). It is of particular importance to ensure financial resources for continuous data transmission, and for operation of other facilities during GSETT-3. Countries are encouraged to assist by providing technical and financial assistance in these areas to other countries whose participation is essential.

12. The Ad Hoc Group received and appreciated a briefing from the Chairman of the Nuclear Test Ban Committee's Working Group on Verification. Upon invitation by the Chairman, the Ad Hoc Group made a presentation to the Working Group on the GSETT-3 experiment.

13. The Ad Hoc Group noted with appreciation the convening of an informal technical workshop "From GSETT-3 to IMS" in Baltimore, Maryland, USA, from 26 through 29 June 1995. The workshop was attended by 55 technical experts from 20 countries. The objective of the workshop was to stimulate discussion on the evaluation and evolution of GSETT-3, and to consider ways to facilitate the transition of the experience gained from GSETT-3 to meet the needs of the Conference on Disarmament and of the future CTBT international organization. Many of the results of this workshop were provided during this session in reports of the national delegations and the Working Groups, and these reports will be valuable in guiding and expediting the future work of the GSE.

The Ad Hoc Group also noted with appreciation the convening of an informal technical seminar "Design, Usage, and Implementation of the AutoDRM" in Zurich, Switzerland, from 1 to 2 June 1995. This seminar, whose purpose was to consider common procedures for automated data exchange, was attended by 18 technical experts from 12 countries.

The Ad Hoc Group likewise noted with appreciation the convening of an informal technical seminar which was held in Bruyères le Châtel, France, from 12 to 13 July 1995 and attended by 17 participants from 7 European countries. The purpose of this seminar was to review initial results of the EUROBULL experiment, whose objective is to produce a high quality European seismic bulletin on a routine basis. Plans for continuation and expanding the participation were also discussed.

14. The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next sessions, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 27 November through 1 December 1995, followed by a session from 12 through 23 February 1996, to carry out the work plan presented in paragraph 10. A draft work programme for the next session is presented in Annex 3. The work programme will be tailored to meet as much as practicable the information needs of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and its Working Group on Verification.

Annex 1

Summary Report on Status and Plans for GSETT-3

1. Introduction

On 1 January 1995, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) Third Technical Test, GSETT-3, successfully began full-scale operations. As stated in CD/1254, the primary objectives of GSETT-3 are to:

- Develop and test new concepts for an experimental International Seismic Monitoring System (ISMS), building upon previous experience;

- Provide a practical basis upon which to furnish the Conference on Disarmament with timely technical information;

- Develop an experimental system that can evolve and adapt to support future requirements that may be specified for an International Seismic Monitoring System.

The concepts for an experimental seismic monitoring system to be tested during GSETT-3 include: a single centralized International Data Centre (IDC), a specifically designed high-quality seismographic network consisting of about 50 primary (Alpha) stations and 100-150 auxiliary (Beta) stations, National Data Centres (NDCs) in participating countries, and a modern communications system to support data exchange among these elements.

The IDC has been in operation since 1 January 1995, with the processing and analysis methods at the IDC being continuously improved as experience is gained. As of this date, 37 primary and 75 auxiliary stations are participating in the experiment. This participation is detailed in the tables and figures in Annex 2.

The global station coverage is presently uneven, and many of the conclusions drawn are based on observational data from selected regions only. These are regions with station coverage corresponding to the original GSETT-3 plan, and the observational results are supplemented by theoretical modelling and are continuously evaluated. Although the number of stations currently participating falls short of that envisaged when the experiment was planned, there is wide enough participation to begin to draw practical conclusions regarding several aspects of the ISMS concept. Some of the most important conclusions are summarized in the Progress Report, and additional details are provided below.

2. GSETT-3 Participation

The global seismograph network envisaged for GSETT-3 is a two-tiered network comprising the so-called primary and auxiliary seismograph stations. The primary stations are designed and located to provide detection and initial location of seismic events throughout the world. The station waveform data are telemetered continuously to the IDC.

The auxiliary stations provide supplementary data, so that events can be located and characterized with improved accuracy. Data from auxiliary stations are not telemetered continuously to the IDC, but waveform segments can be retrieved automatically.

2.1 Primary stations

As of 18 August 1995, 37 stations in the envisaged 60-station GSETT-3 primary network are providing data to the IDC. Only five primary stations have been added to the network since the 40th GSE session in February, which is somewhat disappointing in view of the fact that 49 primary stations were committed for participation already by the time of the February session. It is, however, realistic to assume that at least an additional 5 primary stations will soon take part in GSETT-3, based on information received from primary station host countries during the 41st session. The work related to obtaining commitments for the remaining stations of the primary network has continued, most notably by a visit in May to several Permanent Missions to the United Nations in New York.

2.2 Auxiliary stations

As of 18 August 1995, 106 stations have been offered for the auxiliary station network and 99 of these have been committed for participation in GSETT-3. Out of these 99 stations, 75 are currently used by the IDC, which is an increase from 44 at the time of the 40th GSE session. Still, the geographical distribution of the current auxiliary station network is rather uneven, and many additional candidate auxiliary stations around the world that meet the technical requirements and that are of potential usefulness to GSETT-3 have been identified, in close cooperation with the member networks of the Federation of Digital Seismograph Networks (FDSN).

The GSE is seeking formal commitments for participation in GSETT-3 in direct contact with the authorities of the host countries of such candidate stations. Many positive responses have been received to letters written by the GSE Chairman, but 16 countries have not yet responded to such requests. For some countries, positive responses have been received, but work is underway to determine to which station(s) the commitment received actually applies.

It is still conceivable that the number of auxiliary stations in the GSETT-3 network might approach 150.

3. GSETT-3 Operations

After the flurry of activity which resulted from preparations for the successful start of the full scale test on 1 January 1995, operational procedures at both the NDCs and at the IDC have become more routine with the result that attention is now being directed towards optimizing the whole of the GSETT-3 system and improving its capabilities. A detailed statistical overview of IDC operations and, to a lesser extent, of station and NDC participation, is provided in the bi-weekly performance reports. These reports may be retrieved electronically using the file transfer protocol (ftp) or by interacting with the IDC World-Wide Web(WWW) server on the Internet.

3.1 Status

As Table 1 shows, there are now 33 countries actively participating in GSETT-3 by submitting data to and/or retrieving data from the IDC. Although the station distribution is still far from uniform, data are arriving at the IDC from every continent. The number of primary stations sending continuous, near-real time data to the IDC has increased to 37 while the number of auxiliary stations accessed by the IDC has increased to 75. Communications links and data transmission software from the primary stations to the IDC (often through a communications hub at an NDC) have performed adequately. As a result of further upgrading of the procedures at the IDC, NDC and stations, the reliability of acquiring data from auxiliary stations using direct dial-up and GSE automatic Data Request Manager (AutoDRM) messages via electronic mail, has improved markedly.

Fourteen NDCs (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Romania, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States) are submitting Gamma data in the form of independent seismic event lists. These data are typically more than one month behind real time but are still useful for evaluating and calibrating the GSETT-3 network. These data are now parsed automatically into the IDC database and are available for on-line access by the NDCs.

Starting 1 January 1995, the IDC began full-scale operation seven days per week and 24 hours per day. The IDC produces automatically an Alpha Event List (AEL) based on signals detected in the real time, continuous waveform data from primary stations. Auxiliary waveform segments, which are based on AEL event locations, are then automatically retrieved and an Alpha/Beta Event List (ABEL) is produced. The waveform data is interactively reviewed to produce a Reviewed Event Bulletin (REB). The target times for completing the automatic bulletins are 1 hour (AEL) and 4 hours (ABEL) after event time. The target time for the REB is two days after the end of the data day. With minor exceptions, which have been associated either with large aftershock sequences or with instabilities in a developing system, these target times have been adhered to. REBs have been produced for all data days except for the period 8 May through 14 May when a major malfunction in the redundant array of independent disks prevented data recovery from both the on-line primary and back-up versions of the IDC database. To ensure that any future failures will not have the same consequences, the IDC now maintains three copies of all current on-line data.

Table 1

	1 Feb 1994	20 Aug 1994	20 Feb 1995	18 Aug 1995	Plan
Participating Nations	10	13	28	33	>40
Primary Stations	6	12	32	37	60
Auxiliary Stations	13	21	44	75	-150
Coverage	European	Sparse Global	Global	Global	Global
NDCs Sending Gamma Data	1	5	11	14	20-30
Volume of Data/Day to IDC	0.2 Gbytes	1.5 Gbytes	2.5 Gbytes	2.5 Gbytes	>5 Gbytes
Data Days/Week	2	3	7(24 hrs/ day)	7 (24 hrs/day)	7(24hrs /day)
REB Events/day	20	20	60	60	>100
REB Events Total	1,500	2,700	6,800	12,250	
IDC Staff (int'l)	27(0)	27(0)	47(9)	50(10)	50(9)

There are on average more than 60 events in the REBs each day. This number is not constant but fluctuates widely to over 200 events per day when large earthquakes with their consequent aftershock sequences occur. That both the system and analysis staff can handle these increased loads is encouraging.

Estimates of the magnitude threshold at the 90% confidence level, for detection of a seismic disturbance by three stations in the primary network, range from mb 3.1 in limited areas of northern Europe up to mb 4.7 in the southern oceans. These estimates reflect the geographical distribution and detection capabilities of stations in the current primary network. Typical location uncertainties for events within 2000 km of the closest station are between 40 and 50 km. Completion and calibration of the station network by the use of regional, rather than globally averaged, travel times will improve the detection capability and reduce the location uncertainty.

The number of staff at the IDC is now 50, including 10 international visiting experts. International staffing and training continues to be a high priority of the Working Group on Operations. At the last GSE session, a Working Group paper was tabled inviting GSETT-3 participants to apply for positions at the IDC. The responses have been reviewed during the current session and offers will be extended to the successful candidates.

The IDC is not an operational system; rather it is a prototype system that is evolutionary in nature and is changing as information is gathered during the GSETT-3, as new analysis algorithms are developed and as existing algorithms are improved. Signal processing and automatic association of arrivals to seismic events are major components of the data processing and interpretation segment of the IDC. The signal processing module detects seismic signals and extracts features for subsequent processing and interpretation. These features include signal onset time, azimuth and slowness, polarization parameters, amplitudes, period, signal/noise ratio and others. Based on these features, the automatic association module group detections that appear to come from the same event identify the seismic phases in terms of wave type and propagation paths, and locate events using theoretical Earth models.

The signal processing modules will be replaced with a single new program called DFX (Detection and Feature Extraction). The objectives of this new software package are to improve the quality control and robustness of the feature measurements, generalize the knowledge representation, facilitate the addition of new algorithms and ensure consistency between results from automatic analysis and analyst review. The modules which are used for automatic event association and event location will also be replaced with a new collection of programs called the Global Association (GA) system which uses a gridded search technique. The objectives have been to speed up the event formation process through parallelization and to improve the quality of the automated event lists by reducing the number of missed events.

Surface wave magnitudes (Ms) are an important diagnostic parameter for characterizing the source of the larger events. In May, an automatic procedure for identifying surface waves, estimating their amplitudes and calculating surface wave magnitudes, was implemented at the IDC. Initially, Ms was only calculated for stations with long period channels. Subsequent enhancements of these automatic procedures allow for the computation of surface wave magnitudes from broad-band data channels and long-period arrays. Regional magnitudes (ML) are now also being calculated automatically and included in the REBs. The current automatic procedures use a set of standardized attenuation curves. Regional specific attenuation curves will be incorporated as they become available.

Significant enhancements have been made to the automatic auxiliary data retrieval system with the result that the IDC is now requesting, retrieving and processing much more auxiliary data than earlier in the year. Auxiliary data is currently being requested for about half of the events reported in the REBs. The use of auxiliary data together with analyst review are the major factors in reducing location errors and in improving the quality of the REBs. One of the consequences of the increased auxiliary data contributions has been the discovery of anomalies in instrument response that have been supplied to the IDC, and which have been responsible for some of the station magnitude outliers reported in the REB. IDC staff have worked with NDCs and station operators to correct and update this information as necessary.

An important objective of the IDC data processing is to optimize the automatic procedures and so reduce the amount of interactive analysis. A study of signal processing results for the period 19 February - 1 April has been used to develop new automatic detection parameter recipes for all stations in the primary network. These new recipes were implemented on 2 June and have significantly reduced the number of false detections. At the same time the number of valid detections has increased. Further optimization of these detection recipes will be carried out at periodic intervals.

The data access facilities at the IDC continue to improve. Since the last session, access facilities to the IDC database using the GSE AutoDRM and electronic mail have been upgraded.

The options for obtaining information by subscription have also been extended. It is now possible to tailor subscription requests to obtain bulletin information which is restricted to events from nominated areas, and have magnitudes and depths within specified limits, etc. The IDC World Wide Web (WWW) server has been extensively upgraded and expanded to improve its functionality, to make it more user friendly and to provide access to a larger range of IDC products and services.

The GSETT-3 IDC is not providing identification on detected events, but it has begun compiling a number of agreed parameters which characterize the detected signals and which may assist participating countries in identifying the source of each seismic disturbance. In preparation for adding these event characterization parameters to the near-real time operational pipeline, the IDC has gone back to compute the first subset of these parameters for a one-month period in January and February. Further subsets will be computed as resources permit. NDCs have been invited to access these characterization parameters and to provide comments on them, including: are the parameters computed correctly; are they useful; and which additional parameters might also be useful.

3.2 Operational Plans

A number of significant changes are expected to take place within the IDC over the next six months. It is expected that between 10 and 15 new primary stations, 20 to 40 new auxiliary stations and Gamma data from additional NDCs will be available during this period. The further refinement of the primary and auxiliary acquisition systems will be an important accompaniment to these new data sources. Additional hardware, including a 5 terabyte mass store, will be added to the system. This mass store will allow all raw data and processed products to be accessible, on-line, for a period of several years.

Further upgrading and tuning of the signal processing, automatic association and location software, and the incorporation of an expanded knowledge base into this software, will increase the quality of the IDC products. It will also reduce the analysts' workload. The knowledge base will include regional specific travel times and attenuation curves as well as event locations and source types (Gamma data). Acquiring this knowledge and incorporating it into the IDC processing systems will be a priority and will require active participation and contributions from all NDCs as well as from the IDC. To facilitate participation, Points of Contact (POC) personnel have been nominated at the IDC. The role of these POCs is to act as liaison officers between the NDCs and the various aspects of the IDC operations.

The IDC products will be expanded to include additional event characterization parameters. All IDC data and processed products will be more easily accessible as a result of additional functionality being incorporated into the IDC AutoDRM, the Subscription modules and the WWW server.

4. GSETT-3 Documentation

The GSETT-3 Documentation, CRP/243, comprises the plan for GSETT-3, technical instructions, factual descriptions of facilities to be used, an evaluation plan and numerous technical annexes. This voluminous documentation forms the basis for operations manuals and procedures for GSETT-3. It will also contain technical summaries of IDC and station operations and ongoing evaluation results during GSETT-3. Previous experience has shown that documentation of this type is essential.

A draft version of the GSETT-3 Documentation was produced and distributed in advance of the 39th GSE session in August 1994, and an updated version of this documentation was distributed during the 40th GSE session in February 1995.

Since the 40th session, work has continued to finalize the GSETT-3 documentation, and significant progress was made at a documentation meeting in the United States in May. During and following this meeting, missing text was added, the volumes and annexes were unified with respect to format, style and content, and the documentation was slightly reorganized relative to previous versions. The completed GSETT-3 Documentation is being mailed to the home addresses of GSE delegates.

5. GSETT-3 Evaluation

The Working Group on Evaluation (WGE) visited the prototype International Data Centre (IDC) at the end of June 1995 to prepare its second Evaluation Report on the Experimental International Seismic Monitoring System (EISMS), covering the six-month period from January to June 1995. This evaluation took advantage of many national contributions presented during the GSE Informal Technical Workshop in Baltimore (26 to 29 June).

5.1 Status

Currently there are 37 primary stations (8 more than in January 1995) on-line to the IDC and routine analysis shows that almost all are of high quality, with low noise levels. Although a wide variety of instrumentation is employed at the current primary stations, no adverse effects have been observed. The auxiliary network currently consists of 75 stations. Their number has increased steadily and their impact on event location capability has been clearly demonstrated for some source regions. Nevertheless, application of corrections on azimuth and travel times to take into account the effect of local geology, as recommended in the previous WGE report, is still needed.

The communication links continue to show high reliability, independent of the physical means used (satellite, fibre optic, cable, etc). However, the overall data availability from most of the primary stations (due to a combination of communications links, NDC, IDC and station problems) is far from meeting the 99% target for EISMS stations. Testing of data authentication procedures will be conducted during the next few months.

To date, fifty countries are committed to participating in GSETT-3 and many are in the process of establishing their NDC to provide data and to evaluate their contributions. These NDCs are obviously giving priority to establishing and maintaining their primary and auxiliary stations, thus limiting the time for participation in evaluation tasks. However, the number and quality of papers presented at the Baltimore Workshop was encouraging and shows that many NDCs are aware of the need for their contribution to the evaluation of GSETT-3. The WGE must stress that many more NDCs need to participate in evaluation tasks by sending their Evaluation Reports to the IDC. The information contained in such reports is needed to assess many aspects of the GSETT-3 experiment, including the costs.

The total cost of the IDC operations is 10 million US$ for the present fiscal year, including technical support, communications, development and salaries for a staff of 50 people devoted to operations (23), technical support (17) and other services. In May/June 1995, a quality assurance evaluation of the IDC was carried out. The chief findings were that the contribution of the international experts working at the IDC has been significant, but that the security of the system against data loss is inadequate. The back-up of data to ensure no loss in case of hardware failure needs to be improved. This was clearly demonstrated recently when a disk crash put the IDC out of operation for 6 days and lead to the loss of primary data during that period. More generally, the frequency of serious system failures needs to be reduced.

Reviewed Event Bulletins (REBs) are generated on a daily basis and the basic statistics necessary for the evaluation of GSETT-3 are being accumulated, but the reliability of these processes might be affected by recurrent disk crashes or software problems.

The AutoDRM has been improved and provides more functions, although some of the functions are still missing and responses remain irregular. The IDC contribution through the World Wide Web (WWW) has also improved.

Gamma (or contributed) data are now parsed or inserted into the IDC data base and the retrieval mechanism for data from auxiliary stations is performing better although it still needs improvement.

So far the IDC has concentrated on operations, and tuning of event detection processes has been a low priority task. The problem of spurious detections needs to be solved. Additionally, clear signals with no automatic detection by IDC processes have been identified.

In May 1995, the IDC started processing surface waves from stations with long period instruments, and, more recently, on stations with broad band instruments. MS and ML magnitudes are now computed on a routine basis.

Significant progress has been achieved since February 1995 on event definition, resulting in automatically formed event lists that are closer to the final REB products. However, 20-30% of the events in the final REB are added during analyst review and about 40% of the events automatically formed are rejected by analysts. Since January, the fraction of REB events for which auxiliary data have been retrieved has been nearly constant at around 50 to 60%, which is too low. This is probably due to missing events in the automatic event list, inadequate criteria for data retrieval, technical problems with auxiliary data retrieval, and the sparse and uneven distribution of auxiliary stations.

5.2 Capabilities

The event location capability of the EISMS can be improved with the use of auxiliary data; the size of the confidence ellipse could be reduced particularly in cases where the nearest primary stations are located at far regional or teleseismic distances.

Several NDCs have compared the REB locations with their Gamma data. In the United States (US), the mean location difference was 35 km, in Japan 50 km, in Spain 80 km and in Finland and nearby countries no more than 20 km. A global approach compared REB locations with those in the weekly version of the Preliminary Determination of Epicentres (PDE, a standard worldwide bulletin published in the US). A result of this comparison was that the median location difference for common events decreased from several tens of kilometres at magnitude (mb) 3.5 to about 20 km at magnitudes above 5.5. Nevertheless, another study of IDC results showed that only 20% of the events in the REB had confidence ellipses with areas less than 1,000 km and 35% have confidence ellipses with areas exceeding 10,000 km.

The depths of focus for deep events in the REBs usually compared well with depths given in other bulletins, but this is not so for shallow events. Depths were estimated for only 30% of events reported in the REB.

A questionnaire was distributed to the NDCs in order for the WGE to assess quality of bulletins based on Gamma data. To date 22 out of 28 NDCs have responded to the questionnaire. The WGE urges NDCs that have not responded to do so.

As observed in the IDC Performance Reports, the detection capability of the network has not significantly changed since February 1995, i.e., the network event detection threshold varies from (mb) 3.5 - 4.5 and may be even higher in some regions of the southern hemisphere. These estimates are in good agreement with theoretical simulations and reflect the uneven distribution of stations with sparse coverage of Africa, South America and much of Asia.

5.3 Evaluation plans

In summary, there have been significant improvements in both data processing and procedures during the past six months. However, there are still some important goals to be achieved. Most urgent is the necessity of greater involvement of NDCs both in the contribution of stations and in participation in evaluation tasks. The IDC should continue to improve the quality assurance procedures and provide a documented plan to calibrate and tune the network. The IDC should also give priority to refining automatic procedures and event location, including depth estimation, especially for shallow events.

The next evaluation period should confirm the increased performance of the EISMS through the application of such recommendations.

Annex 2

Table 1: Status of GSETT3 Station and Gamma Data Commitments as of 18 August 1995

Country	Alpha Stations Envisaged by GSE	Beta Stations Offered	Station Commitment Status	Data Available to IDC	Gamma Data Committed
Argentina	1	1	committed	1994/Jan. 1996	yes
Australia	5	12	committed	1994	yes
Austria	0	1	lacking	1995	-
Belgium	0	0	not applicable	not applicable	yes
Bolivia	1	-	committed	Aug. 1995	-
Botswana	1	-	lacking	unknown	-
Brazil	1	2	committed/lacking	1994/1995	-
Bulgaria	0	1	committed	1995	yes
Canada	6	18	committed	1994	yes
Cen. Afr. Republic	1	-	committed	1994	
Chile	0	1	committed	-	-
China	3	0	committed	Sept. 1995	yes
Colombia	1	0	committed	1995	yes
Cook Islands	0	1	committed	1994	-
Costa Rica	0	1	committed	-	-
Czech Republic	0	1	committed	1994	yes
Denmark	1	0	lacking	unknown	yes
Egypt	1	0	lacking	unknown	-
Ethiopia	0	1	committed	March 1995	-
Finland	1	2	committed	1994	yes
France	1	0	committed	Jan. 1995	yes
Germany	1	9	committed	1994	yes
Hungary	0	1	committed	1994	yes
Iceland	0	1	committed	-	-
India	1	0	committed	unknown	-
Indonesia	1	-	lacking	unknown	-
Iran	1	1	committed	1995	yes
Israel	0	1	committed	July 1995	yes
Italy	0	2	committed	1994	yes
Ivory Coast	1	-	committed	June 1995	-
Japan	1	7	committed	1994/Sept. 1995	yes
Kazakhstan	1	-	committed	unknown	-
Kenya	1	-	lacking	unknown	-
Rep. of Korea	1	-	lacking	unknown	-
Mexico	1	2	lacking	unknown	-
Mongolia	1	1	committed	1995	-
Netherlands	0	1	committed	1994	yes
New Zealand	0	1	committed	1994	yes
Norway	3	1	committed	1994/1995	yes
Pakistan	1	1	committed	1995	-
Papua New Guinea	1	-	committed[1]	Jan. 1995	-

[1] *Envisaged Alpha station currently used as Beta station*

Country	Alpha Stations Envisaged by GSE	Beta Stations Offered	Station Commitment Status	Data Available to IDC	Gamma Data Committed
Paraguay	1	-	committed	1994	-
Peru	0	1	committed	1995	yes
Philippines	0	1	committed	-	-
Poland	0	1	lacking	unknown	yes
Portugal	0	1	committed	-	-
Romania	0	1	committed	1996	yes
Russian Federation	5	5	committed	1994/1995	yes
Seychelles	0	1	committed	-	-
Solomon Islands	0	1	committed	March 1995	
South Africa	1	1	committed	1994/1995	yes
Spain	1	2	committed	Jan. 1995	yes
Sweden	1	0	committed	Jan. 1995	yes
Switzerland	0	1	committed	Jan. 1995	yes
Thailand	1	-	committed	Feb. 1995	-
Tunisia	1	-	lacking	Late 1995	-
Turkey	1	-	committed	unknown	-
Turkmenistan	1	-	committed	Aug. 1995	-
Ukraine	0	1	committed	1995	-
United Kingdom	0	3	committed	1994/1995	yes
United States	7	12	committed	1994/1995	yes
Venezuela	0	1	committed	1995	-
Western Samoa	0	1	committed	1994	-
Zambia	0	1	committed	Jan. 1995	-
TOTAL (Committed)	60(50)	106 (99)	53 countries		30

Table 2: GSETT-3 Stations

Station Name (in alphabetical order by country and type)	Code	Type	Station Type	Latitude	Longitude	Data used by IDC as of 18 August 1995
Argentina						
Paso Flores	PLCA	α	3-C	-40.731	-70.550	yes
Coronel Fontana	CFA	β	3-C	-31.607	-68.239	no
Australia						
Alice Springs	ASAR	α	array	-23.666	133.904	yes
Mawson, Antarctica	MAW	α	3-C	-67.604	62.871	yes
Stephens Creek	STKA	α	3-C	-31.882	141.592	yes
Warramunga	WRA	α	array	-19.943	134.339	yes
Woolibar	WOOL	α	3-C	-31.073	121.678	yes
Armidale	ARMA	β	3-C	-30.420	151.628	yes
Casey	CSY	β	1-C	-66.289	110.529	yes
Charters Towers	CTA	β	3-C	-20.088	146.254	yes
Fitzroy Crossing	FITZ	β	3-C	-18.103	125.643	yes
Forrest	FORT	β	1-C	-30.779	128.059	yes
Meekatharra	MEEK	β	1-C	-26.614	118.536	yes
Mount Isa	QIS	β	1-C	-20.558	139.605	yes
Narrogin	NWAO	β	3-C	-32.927	117.233	yes
Roma	RMQ	β	1-C	-26.489	148.755	yes
Toolangi	TOO	β	3-C	-37.571	145.491	yes
Warburtan	WARB	β	3-C	-26.184	126.643	yes
Young	YOU	β	1-C	-34.278	148.382	yes
Austria						
Molln	MOA	β	3-C	47.850	14.266	no
Bolivia						
La Paz	LPAZ	α	3-C	-16.288	-68.131	yes

Station Name (in alphabetical order by country and type)	Code	Type	Station Type	Latitude	Longitude	Data used by IDC as of 16 August 1995
Botswana						
Lobatse	LBTB	α	3-C	-25.015	25.597	no
Brazil						
Brasilia	BDFB	α	3-C	-15.642	-48.015	yes
Pitinga	PTGA	β	3-C	-3.060	-60.000	no
Rio Grande do Norte	RGNB	β	3-C	-6.910	-36.950	no
Bulgaria						
Vitosha	VTS	β	3-C	42.618	23.238	no
Canada						
Lac du Bonnet	ULM	α	3-C	50.250	-95.875	yes
Mould Bay	MBC	α	3-C	76.242	-119.360	yes
Schefferville	SCHQ	α	3-C	54.817	-66.783	yes
Waterton Lakes	WALA	α	3-C	49.059	-113.912	yes
Whitehorse	WHY	α.	3-C	60.660	-134.881	yes
Yellowknife	YKA	α	array	62.493	-114.605	yes
Bella Bella	BBB	β	3-C	52.185	-128.113	yes
Caledonia Mtn.	LMN	β	3-C	45.852	-64.806	yes
Dawson City	DAWY	β	3-C	64.066	-139.391	yes
Dease Lake	DLBC	β	3-C	58.417	-130.060	yes
Deer Lake	DRLN	β	3-C	49.256	-57.504	yes
Edmonton	EDM	β	3-C	53.222	-113.350	yes
Eldee	EEO	β	1-C	46.641	-79.073	yes
Fort Churchill	FCC	β	3-C	58.761	-94.087	yes
Glen Almond	GAC	β	3-C	45.703	-75.478	yes
Inuvik	INK	β	3-C	68.307	-133.520	yes
Iqaluit	FRB	β	3-C	63.747	-68.547	yes
La Malbaie	LMQ	β	3-C	47.548	-70.327	yes

Station Name (in alphabetical order by country and type)	Code	Type	Station Type	Latitude	Longitude	Data used by IDC as of 18 August 1995
Pac. Geoscience	PGC	β	3-C	48.650	-123.451	yes
Pemberton	PMB	β	3-C	50.520	-123.073	yes
Penticton	PNT	β	3-C	49.317	-119.617	yes
Resolute Bay	RES	β	3-C	74.687	-94.900	yes
Sadowa	SADO	β	3-C	44.769	-79.142	yes
Thunder Bay	TBO	β	1-C	48.647	-89.408	yes
Central African Republic						
Bangui	BGCA	α	3-C	5.176	18.424	yes
Chile						
To be defined		β	3-C			no
China						
Beijing	BJT	α	3-C	40.040	116.180	no
Hailar	HIA	α	3-C	49.267	119.742	no
Lanzhou	LZH	α	3-C	36.087	103.844	no
Colombia						
To be defined	XSA	α	3-C			no
Cook Islands						
Rarotonga	RAR	β	3-C	-21.213	-159.773	yes
Costa Rica						
Las Juntas de Abangares	JTS	β	3-C	10.290	-87.950	no
Czech Republic						
Vranov	VRAC	β	3-C	49.311	16.596	yes
Denmark						
Danmarkshavn	DAG	α	3-C	76.770	-18.650	no
Egypt						
LUXESS	LXAR	α	array	26.000	33.000	no

Station Name (in alphabetical order by country and type)	Code	Type	Station Type	Latitude	Longitude	Data used by IDC as of 18 August 1995
Ethiopia						
Addis Ababa	AAE	β	3-C	9.029	38.766	yes
Finland						
FINESS	FINES	α	array	61.444	26.077	yes
Kangasniemi	KAF	β	3-C	62.113	26.306	yes
Ylistaro	VAF	β	3-C	63.042	22.672	yes
France						
Lormes	LOR	α	3-C	47.268	3.859	yes
Germany						
GERESS	GERES	α	array	48.845	13.702	yes
Berggiesshübel	BRG	β	3-C	50.875	13.947	yes
Black Forest	BFO	β	3-C	48.331	8.330	yes
Bochum	BUG	β	3-C	51.446	7.264	yes
Clausthal-Zellerfeld	CLZ	β	3-C	51.843	10.374	yes
Collm	CLL	β	3-C	51.310	13.000	yes
Fürstenfeldbruck	FUR	β	3-C	48.164	11.277	yes
Gräfenberg	GRFO	β	3-C	49.692	11.205	yes
Moxa	MOX	β	3-C	50.646	11.616	yes
Taunus	TNS	β	3-C	50.224	8.449	yes
Hungary						
Piszkes	PSZ	β	3-C	47.918	19.895	yes
Iceland						
Borgarnes	BORG	β	3-C	64.500	-21.500	no
India						
Gauribidanur	GBA	α	array	13.604	77.436	no
Indonesia						

Station Name (in alphabetical order by country and type)	Code	Type	Station Type	Latitude	Longitude	Data used by IDC as of 18 August 1995
To be defined	XIN	α	3-C			no
Iran						
Tehran	THR	α	3-C	35.818	51.393	no
To be defined		β	3-C			no
Israel						
Bar Giyora	BGIO	β	3-C	31.722	35.092	yes
Italy						
L'Aquila	AQU	β	3-C	42.354	13.405	yes
Villasalto	VSL	β	3-C	39.496	9.378	yes
Ivory Coast						
Dimborko	DBIC	α	3-C	6.670	-4.856	yes
Japan						
Matsushiro	MJAR	α	array	36.543	138.207	yes
Aobayama	AOB	β	3-C	38.250	140.850	no
Chichijima	OGS	β	3-C	27.060	142.200	no
Hachijojima	HCH	β	3-C	33.120	139.800	no
Ishigakijima	ISG	β	3-C	24.380	124.230	no
Kaminokuni	KKJ	β	3-C	41.780	140.180	no
Shiraki	SHK	β	3-C	34.530	132.680	no
Tsukuba	TSK	β	3-C	36.210	140.110	no
Kazakhstan						
Aktubinsk	AKT0	α	array	50.434	58.018	no
Kenya						
Nairobi	KMBO	α	3-C	-1.274	36.804	no
Korea, Republic of						
To be defined	XKO0	α	array	37.000	128.000	no

Station Name (in alphabetical order by country and type)	Code	Type	Station Type	Latitude	Longitude	Data used by IDC as of 18 August 1995
Mexico						
To be defined	XMEX	α	3-C	18.000	-96.000	no
Chilapa	CHAM	β	3-C	17.000	-99.000	no
Iguala	IGUM	β	3-C	19.000	-100.000	no
Mongolia						
To be defined	XMON	α	3-C			no
Ulaan-Baatar	ULN	β	3-C	47.520	107.030	yes
Netherlands						
Heimansgroeve	HGN	β	3-C	50.764	5.932	yes
New Zealand						
South Karori	SNZ0	β	3-C	-41.310	174.705	yes
Norway						
ARCESS	ARCES	α	array	69.535	25.506	yes
NORSAR	NAO	α	array	60.824	10.832	no
Spitsbergen	SPITS	α	array	78.178	16.370	yes
NORESS	NORES	β	array	60.735	11.541	yes, as α station
Pakistan						
Pari	PKAR	α	array	33.050	73.252	no
Nilore	NIL	β	3-C	33.600	73.100	no
Papua New Guinea						
Port Moresby	PMG	α	3-C	-9.409	147.154	yes, as β station
Paraguay						
Villa Florida	CPUP	α	3-C	-26.331	-57.329	yes
Peru						
Nana	NNA	β	3-C	-11.990	-76.840	no

Station Name (in alphabetical order by country and type)	Code	Type	Station Type	Latitude	Longitude	Data used by IDC as of 18 August 1995
Philippines						
To be defined		β	3-C			no
Poland						
To be defined		β	3-C			no
Portugal						
To be defined		β	3-C			no
Romania						
Muntele Rosu	MLR	β	3-C	45.492	25.944	no
Russian Federation						
Khabaz	KBZ	α	3-C	43.729	42.898	no
Norilsk	NRI	α	3-C	69.400	88.100	no
Peleduy	PDY	α	3-C	59.633	112.700	yes
Ussuriisk	USK	α	3-C	44.283	132.083	no
Zalesovo	ZAL	α	3-C	53.940	84.805	no
Arti	ARU	β	3-C	56.430	58.563	yes
Kislovodsk	KIV0	β	array	43.956	42.695	yes
Obninsk	OBN	β	3-C	55.117	36.600	yes
Urgal	URG	β	3-C	51.099	132.364	no
Zilim	UFA	β	3-C	53.850	57.050	no
Seychelles						
Mahe	MSEY	β	3-C	-4.610	55.490	no
Solomon Islands						
Honiara	HNR	β	3-C	-9.432	159.947	yes
South Africa						
Boshof	BOSA	α	3-C	-28.614	25.556	yes
Silverton	SLR	β	3-C	-25.740	28.280	no

Station Name (in alphabetical order by country and type)	Code	Type	Station Type	Latitude	Longitude	Data used by IDC as of 18 August 1995
Spain						
Sonseca	ESDC	α	array	39.677	-3.962	yes
San Pablo de los Montes	PAB	β	3-C	39.546	-4.348	yes
Taburiente	TBT	β	3-C	28.679	-17.913	yes
Sweden						
Hagfors	HFS	α	array	60.134	13.697	yes
Switzerland						
Alpnach	APL	β	3-C	46.950	8.243	yes
Thailand						
Chiang Mai	CMAR	α	array	18.458	98.943	yes
Tunisia						
Thala	THA	α	3-C	35.560	8.700	no
Turkey						
To be defined	XTUR	α	array	39.000	34.000	no
Turkmenistan						
Alibek	ABKT	α	3-C	37.930	58.119	yes
Ukraine						
Kiev	KIEV	β	3-C	50.694	29.208	yes
United Kingdom						
Eskdalemuir	EKA	β	array	55.333	-3.159	yes
Wolverton	WOL	β	3-C	51.313	-1.223	no
Ascension Island	ASCN	β	3-C	-7.950	-14.380	no
United States						
Lajitas	TXAR	α	array	29.334	-103.667	yes
Lisbon	LBNH	α	3-C	44.240	-71.926	yes
Mount Ida	MIAR	α	3-C	34.546	-93.573	yes

Station Name (in alphabetical order by country and type)	Code	Type	Station Type	Latitude	Longitude	Data used by IDC as of 15 August 1995
North Pole	NPO	α	3-C	64.771	-146.887	yes
Pinedale	PDAR	α	array	42.767	-109.558	yes
Pinon Flats	PFO	α	3-C	33.609	-116.455	yes
Vanda, Antarctica	VNDA	α	3-C	-77.514	161.846	yes
Albuquerque	ALQ	β	3-C	34.946	-106.457	yes
Black Hills	RSSD	β	3-C	44.120	-104.036	yes
Blacksburg	BLA	β	3-C	37.211	-80.421	yes
Dugway	DUG	β	3-C	40.195	-112.816	yes
Elko	ELK	β	3-C	40.745	-115.239	yes
Ely	EYMN	β	3-C	47.947	-91.508	yes
Kanab	KNB	β	3-C	37.020	-112.820	no
Mina	MNV	β	3-C	38.433	-118.153	yes
Newport	NEW	β	3-C	48.263	-117.120	yes
Tucson	TUC	β	3-C	32.310	-110.785	yes
Tuckaleechee Caverns	TKL	β	3-C	35.658	-83.774	yes
Tulsa	TUL	β	3-C	35.911	-95.793	yes
Venezuela						
Santo Domingo	SDV	β	3-C	8.879	-70.633	yes
Western Samoa						
Afiamalu	AFI	β	3-C	-13.909	-171.779	yes
Zambia						
Lusaka	LSZ	β	3-C	-15.277	28.188	yes



Fig. 1. Alpha stations used by the IDC as of 18 August 1995. Arrays are shown as filled circles and three-component stations as filled triangles.



Fig. 2. Beta stations used by the IDC as of 18 August 1995. Arrays are shown as filled circles and three- and one-component stations as filled triangles.

Annex 3

Draft work programme for the next (42nd) session

1. Review of initial draft of a GSETT-3 evaluation report

2. Review of initial list of recommended auxiliary stations
3. Review of initial draft plan for the GSETT-3 to IMS transition

4. Discussion of future plans

5. Answer possible questions relating to GSETT-3 from the NTB Ad Hoc Committee or its Working Group on Verification

6. Submission of a progress report to the CD

7. Other matters

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1342
24 August 1995

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 22 AUGUST 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF CHILE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING AN OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF CHILE ON 19 AUGUST 1995 CONDEMNING THE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION CONDUCTED RECENTLY BY CHINA

The Permanent Mission of Chile to the United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the official communiqué issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile on 19 August condemning the nuclear explosion conducted recently by the People's Republic of China.

The Permanent Mission of Chile requests the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament to arrange for this communiqué to be distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

best copy available

Official communiqué

The Government of Chile expresses its forceful condemnation of the further detonation of a nuclear device carried out by the People's Republic of China on 16 August at the Lop Nor test site on the Chinese mainland.

This explosion, the second to be carried out by China in the past three months, stands in clear contradiction to the principles and objectives for non-proliferation agreed upon by the international community, the People's Republic of China included, during the Conference on the review and extension of the non-proliferation Treaty held last May. During the Conference, the nuclear Powers agreed to exercise utmost restraint with regard to this type of test pending the entry into force of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT).

This explosion also contrasts with the recent positive announcements made by the nuclear Powers regarding acceptance of the proposal to ban all types of nuclear experiments or explosions without reservations (the zero option), in the context of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty which it is hoped to conclude in 1996. Hence the timing could not be more unfortunate, when the entire world is displaying special awareness of these tests and a progressive and firm resolve to move forward in all areas of nuclear disarmament with the aim of achieving a total ban on nuclear weapons as soon as possible, as the best guarantee of international peace and security.

Consequently, the Government of Chile, which strongly opposed the nuclear tests announced by France in the South Pacific, considers that the explosions recorded in the People's Republic of China, even though they took place in a region far distant from Chile's geopolitical interests, should be completely rejected.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1343
28 August 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 AUGUST 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY OF THE WHITE HOUSE ON 17 AUGUST 1995 CONCERNING THE NUCLEAR TEST CONDUCTED BY CHINA ON THAT DAY

Attached is a copy of a Statement by the Press Secretary of the White House made on 17 August 1995, concerning the nuclear test conducted by China on that day.

I would be grateful if you would issue this document as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants in the work of the CD.

(Signed): Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY, 17 AUGUST 1995

Today China conducted an underground nuclear test at the Lop Nur test site in north-west China. The United States deeply regrets this action. All of the Nuclear Weapon States agreed at the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NTP) Review and Extension Conference in New York in May 1995 to exercise "utmost restraint" in nuclear testing pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). We urge China to refrain from further nuclear tests and join in a global moratorium as we work to complete a CTBT in 1996. We further urge China to endorse President Clinton's recent call for a true "zero yield" CTBT.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1344
28 August 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 22 AUGUST 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PHILIPPINES ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, HIS EXCELLENCY FIDEL V. RAMOS, CONCERNING THE RECENT CHINESE NUCLEAR TEST

I have the honour to communicate to you the attached statement of H.E. Fidel V. Ramos, President of the Philippines, concerning the recent Chinese nuclear test.

I would be grateful if the above-mentioned statement could be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): LILIA R. BAUTISTA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

STATEMENT OF H.E. PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS OF THE PHILIPPINES ON CHINESE NUCLEAR TEST

18 August 1995

The Philippines strongly deplores the test of a nuclear device which China conducted yesterday.

The test was the second that China had conducted since the Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in April this year. It manifestly violated the understanding that had prevailed at the NPT Review Conference that all nuclear-weapons States would exercise utmost restraint with respect to nuclear testing pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty in 1996.

China's decision to continue testing flies in the face of the statement by the ASEAN regional forum earlier this month, which called on nuclear-weapons States to bring an immediate end to nuclear testing.

The Philippines urges China, as well as France, to abandon plans for further nuclear tests, which have raised serious concerns about the sincerity of the nuclear-weapons States, and deter disarmament initiatives, including the conclusion of a test-ban treaty.

The Philippines has consistently taken an active stand on issues relating to nuclear testing. Following China's previous test and the announcement by France of its plans to resume tests in the South Pacific, we have in our capacity as Chairman of the Group of 77, initiated resolutions in multilateral fora, including the United Nations General Assembly and the International Atomic Energy Agency, calling for an end to nuclear tests and for strict adherence to understandings reached in the Review Conference. We have also taken an active role in pushing for the establishment of a South-East Asia nuclear-weapons-free zone.

ONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1345
6 September 1995

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 5 SEPTEMBER 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN CONNECTION WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS OF A MORATORIUM ON THE EXPORT OF ANTI-PERSONNEL LAND-MINES

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of a press release issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus on 4 September 1995 in connection with the announcement by the Republic of Belarus of a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines.

Please take the appropriate steps to register this document as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and ensure its distribution among all delegations of member States and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed) Stanislau AGURTSOU
Ambassador, Permanent Representative
Republic of Belarus
Head of delegation

PRESS RELEASE

Issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus in connection with the announcement by the Republic of Belarus of a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines

The President of the Republic of Belarus, consistently pursuing the principles of national policy in the field of disarmament, and also following the spirit of United Nations initiatives in the field of mine clearance, in the desire to limit the spread of the most dangerous types of conventional weapon having indiscriminate effects, has issued decree No. 355 of 22 August 1995 introducing a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines applicable in the Republic of Belarus from 1 September 1995 until the end of 1997.

In taking this decision, the Republic of Belarus had in mind that not only participants in military actions but also to a considerable extent the civilian population fall victim to this type of weapon, a fact which underlines the inhuman nature of anti-personnel land-mines. In view of its scale at the present time, the problem of mine clearance is regarded by the Republic of Belarus as a priority issue in international relations.

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